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ABSTRACT
The importance of interbank rates for unsecured funding has increased vastly the last decades with
the expansion of financial instruments. Today’s interbank rates are arguably the most influential
benchmarks in pricing of assets and an important indicator on the state an economy. In the
aftermath of the financial crisis, the awareness of weaknesses of interbank rates surfaced. The
awareness has led to a tightening of the regulations regarding the Norwegian Interbank Offered
Rate (NIBOR). The purpose of this paper is to identify the nature of NIBOR in both a domestic
and international context, and expand on NIBOR’s ability to accurately reflect the lending cost
between Norwegian prime banks. The first part of the paper uses the Nelson-Siegel and Vasicek
models to compare offered rates against observable financing cost using unsecured corporate bonds.
NIBOR has historically been quoted higher than both STIBOR and EURIBOR, and we find that
Norwegian banks contributing to NIBOR and STIBOR face the same financing costs as European
banks contributing to EURIBOR. This implies that the differences between interbank rates cannot
be justified by higher financing costs. When comparing the interbank rates to domestic financing
costs, we are unable to determine if banks contributing to NIBOR are more or less accurate in the
Norwegian interbank market compared to other interbank markets where these banks are present.
In the second part of the paper, we compare individual interest rate quotes to credit default
swaps, and observe an inconsistent relationship between panel banks’ quotes and their market
priced risk over time. By applying a hidden markov model, we examine individual short term
behavioral dynamics during the opening of the day, and preceding the fixing. Our results indicate
that interpretation of information varies across participants, which is a possible weakness of the
governance structure.
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I. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to examine and evaluate the validity and trustworthiness of the Nor-
wegian interbank rate through an empirical analysis. By reviewing historical data for NIBOR itself
compared to other relevant sources of data, we aim to highlight some of the consistencies and per-
haps inconsistencies in the most important benchmark rate in the Norwegian money market: The
Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate.
A. A brief history of interbank offered rates
It is difficult to establish a clear definition, interpretation or answer to what interest rates really
represents, but their existence has been essential in the development of financial markets. During
the 11th century, the first recorded deposit rate was offered by the Bank of Venice (Homer u.a.,
2005). As the financial foundations in modern Europe arose during the forthcoming centuries, loans
with maturity less than a year were being offered by central banks for short term funding to local
and foreign merchants, and the establishment of standardized interest rate markets arose. Short
term interest rates in the Norwegian money market dates back to 1818, governed solely by the
central bank of Norway, Norges Bank (2015).
Our interpretation of interest rates was reformed during the 1970’s and 1980’s with the emer-
gence of financial instruments such as derivatives, complex coupon structures and index-linked
bonds. As financial parties actively traded derivatives over the counter in London, the British
Bankers’ Association established the first standardized, but decentralized interest rates. The US
Dollar London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) was officially established January 1. 1986 (Jordan,
2009), and has since been quoting daily interest rates for a variety of maturities. The existence of
interbank rates serves several purposes. Most importantly, interest rates for unsecured lending is
an accurate proxy for the state of macroeconomic and liquidity conditions in a country or market,
and provides a building block for the pricing of financial assets. Since the establishment of LIBOR,
nearly every developed financial ecosystem has established their own offered rate for the interbank
market, such as Tokyo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, the eurozone and Norway.
During recent years, the number of exchange-traded and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives
traded between parties has increased vastly. Derivatives, which are financial instruments whose
value solely rely on other factors - such as the interest rate, are popularly provided in markets
for investment and risk management. The emergence of the derivatives market is illustrated with
data from Bank for International Settlements (2015) in the left graph in figure 1, where the deriva-
tives market is decomposed into interest rate, foreign exchange, equity and CDS derivatives. The
derivatives market is dominated by financial instruments linked to interest rates, which is decom-
posed in the graph to the right in figure 1. The three main sources of derivatives are forward rate
agreements, interest rate swaps, and interest rate-linked options. These derivatives with trillions
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Figure 1. The evolution of OTC derivative volumes and interest rate-linked derivatives during
1998-2014 (trillions USD).
in notional value are priced contingent on the development of some underlying factor. The value
of the majority of interest rate derivatives are dependent on a benchmark such as NIBOR, LIBOR
and EURIBOR.
Having a well-functioning money market independent of the central bank is important to ensure
that interest rates reflect the cost of unsecured loans between financial corporations. Historically,
the interbank rates have proven to be a superior estimate to the market lending cost compared to
government Treasury bills and bonds, and is today the benchmark for the markets interest rate.
During the three last centuries, the interbank rates have been quoted daily for a variety of matu-
rities. The interest rate for unsecured loans can be decomposed into three concepts; the risk-free
interest rate, default risk premium, and currency risk.
An important concept within interest rates is the risk-free interest rate. A risk-free return is
defined as the financial gain from investing in an asset with no risk of financial loss. Investing in
an asset with no default risk is still not necessarily risk-free, as there is interest risk if the future
risk-free rate is uncertain. An investment in a risk-free asset implies that an investor chooses to
receive a fixed payment equivalent to today’s risk-free rate, instead of continuously investing in
the future risk-free rate. The reinvestment requirement for risk-free assets states that an investor
at any time should be able to reinvest in the risk-free asset. In reality, it is impossible to find an
asset which is truly risk-free, but in many cases, government Treasury bills are a good proxy for
the risk-free interest rate.
The interbank offered rate serves many important purposes, but there are also drawbacks to the
structure and nature of the interbank offered rates. The most obvious one is having them reported
at such high frequencies that they often are based on hypothetical transactions. As they are offered
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rates they are not binding, and serve as an estimate of the cost of lending money unsecured in the
interbank market, a cost determined solely by each contributing member. Short maturities and
few transactions make validating the offered rates challenging and perhaps problematic as there
are derivatives worth trillions of dollars contingent on the interbank rates across the world. The
awareness of the weaknesses of the interbank offered rates surfaced during the LIBOR-scandal,
which uncovered comprehensive manipulation of the London Interbank Offered Rate.
To facilitate for a Norwegian interbank money market, and make the Norwegian krone less
dependent upon the US Dollar, the Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate was established in 1986.
B. What is NIBOR?
NIBOR - Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate is a collective term for Norwegian money market
rates with different maturities. The major participants in the Norwegian money and currency
market, which are referred to as panel banks, determine NIBOR. Participation is voluntary, but
the requirement for being a panel bank is to be active in the Norwegian money market. NIBOR is
calculated as an average of the submitted quotes from each panel bank after removing the highest
and lowest outlier.
Finance Norway, which is the industry organization for the financial industry in Norway, has
an official mandate to administrate and govern NIBOR. According to Finance Norway, the aim of
the submitted NIBOR quotes is to reflect the level of interest rate a panel bank requires to lend
unsecured NOK with delivery in two days, ”spot”, to another leading bank that is active in the
Norwegian money and currency market. NIBOR is hence defined as a lending rate, and the interest
rates are based on the individual banks’ lending and currency costs. The reported interest rates are
the individual panel banks’ best estimate on their lending cost, and are not in any form considered
to be a binding offer(FinanceNorway, 2015).
Due to the dollar and euro market being the preferred liquidity source, the Norwegian Interbank
Offered Rate is often approximated as a currency swap rate. Each panel bank determines their
lending cost based on the current interest rates in USD/EUR money market. Using c as notation
for foreign currency abroad, NIBOR can be expressed as follows
(1 + iNIBOR) = (1 + iN,C)
F
S
, (1)
where F is the forward rate and S is the spot rate in number of NOK for each unit of foreign
currency, and iN,C is the foreign lending cost for Norwegian banks. On logarithmic form, this
simplifies to
iNIBOR = iN,C + f − s. (2)
We previously introduced the concept of risk-free interest rates, denoted rf , which is the default
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free compensation required to exchange a fixed rate for future floating rates. In a foreign economy
with no currency risk the interest rate for unsecured loans is
iC,C = rfC + rpC , (3)
where rpc is the premium for default risk in the foreign economy. This equation could be
subject to further expansion by examining two different cases for Norwegian banks when lending
in the foreign economy. If Norwegian banks can lend to domestic interbank rate, iC,C = iN,C , then
NIBOR can be written as
iNIBOR = rfC + rpC + f − s. (4)
However, if lending to a Norwegian bank in a foreign economy has a different risk exposure
compared to the domestic banks, iC,C 6= iN,C , Norwegian banks face a different risk premium
compared to the domestic banks. This difference rpN , can be either positive or negative depending
on relative risk. This entails rewriting NIBOR as
iNIBOR = rfC + rpC + f − s+ rpN . (5)
C. History of NIBOR
The oldest official records of NIBOR from Norges Bank dates back to 1986. However, the inter-
est rate’s importance has increased vastly during the 21st century, which also has been a turbulent
period for NIBOR. Preceding the financial crisis in 2008, the underlying rate was LIBOR. Due to
the lack of regulatory framework, it was highly unclear what NIBOR really was expressing, and
with the financial crisis came volatile times in the financial markets. As the financial instability was
at its peak with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, both LIBOR and the volatility of LIBOR rose
significantly. The NIBOR panel banks decided to leave LIBOR as their reference rate for foreign
lending cost in September 2008. The new reference rate became the dollar rate published by Carl
Kliem Interbank & Security Brokers (Bernhardsen u.a., 2012).
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the panel banks, with support from Norges Bank, ex-
pressed the need for Finance Norway to take charge of NIBOR. Finance Norway was asked to
formalize NIBOR, as the importance of NIBOR in the derivatives market and as a reference rate
was rapidly increasing. Finance Norway implemented the first formal NIBOR regulations in August
2011. Although the regulations only were a formalization of established practice, it now became
more evident what NIBOR really was, and the panel banks’ responsibilities (Stokstad, 2014). The
NIBOR steering group was also implemented, and was given the role of continuously assessing both
the regulations and the submitted quotes, and advice Finance Norway accordingly (FinanceNor-
way, 2013).
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The period both preceding and following this implementation was influenced by the early sus-
picion and evidence of the London interbank offering rate being manipulated. During this volatile
period, the NIBOR regulations were under constant assessment. Already on October 5th 2011
the Ministry of Finance, the ministry responsible for planning and implementing the Norwegian
economic policy, requested the Norges Bank to assess Finance Norway’s new rules for NIBOR. In
its reply to the Ministry of Finance, Norges Bank pointed out both the lack of transparency in the
interest rate setting, and insufficient guidelines and governance to address principal-agent prob-
lems that could occur within and between the banks. The Ministry of Finance formally requested
Finanstilsynet, the Financial Supervisory Authority in Norway, to thoroughly review the NIBOR
regulations (Finanstilsynet, 2012).
The conclusion of the review was forwarded to the Ministry of Finance in April 2013, pointing
out several weaknesses with the current NIBOR system, and Finance Norway implemented several
changes in June 2013. They introduced the NIBOR compliance committee, and increased trans-
parency through requirements of documentation regarding the assessment of the quote. In addition,
Finance Norway was now responsible for making the individual panel bank quotes available for the
public (FinanceNorway, 2013). This was however only the first phase of changes to the regulations.
The second phase was implemented on December 9th 2013, which in addition to previous changes
included Oslo Børs as the new calculating agent, a reduction the number of maturities from ten to
five(as of January 1st 2014), and guidelines for how the NIBOR quotes should be determined among
the individual banks. These are the last changes done to the NIBOR regulations (FinanceNorway,
2013).
D. NIBOR today
As of 2015 there are six banks submitting NIBOR quotes each day, namely DNB Bank ASA,
Danske Bank, Handelsbanken, Nordea Bank Norge ASA, SEB AB and Swedbank. These partici-
pants report their estimated interest rate for maturities 1 week, 1 month, 2 months, 3 months and
6 months to the NIBOR calculating agent, Oslo Børs. Oslo Børs continuously records submitted
quotes, indicative deposit rates (IDR), during the day. The IDRs reflect what the individual banks
believe the current market rate to be throughout the entire day. At 12:00 pm Oslo Børs extracts
the most recent IDR from each bank, removes the highest and lowest outlier, and then calculates
NIBOR based on an average of the remaining IDRs (FinanceNorway, 2013).
The governance structure of NIBOR has been strengthened significantly in recent years through
establishment of an improved governance structure. Today the regulation and development of NI-
BOR is no longer only in the hands of Finance Norway, it is also in the hands of the NIBOR
steering group, the NIBOR compliance committee, and the NIBOR monitoring body. The NIBOR
steering group is a precautionary measure in the way that it is responsible of following up on the
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development and implementation of the regulations. The NIBOR compliance committee is on the
other hand monitoring compliance with rules and the correctness of reported data. Oslo Børs has,
in addition to being calculating agent, the role as NIBOR monitoring body. This role entails being
a support function for the compliance committee by supplying relevant information in line with
their tasks.
II. Background
The Norwegian Offered Interbank is currently administered by Finance Norway. As of 2014,
they revised the calculation and control regime in order to make the fixing process more transparent,
and to increase the trustworthiness of the reference rate. The Oslo Børs Market Surveillance now
has a responsibility of following up on unexpected activity in the interest rate fixing. In this regard,
Finance Norway has expressed the wish for a comparative analysis of cross-country governance of
interbank rates in light of the LIBOR scandal. In the extension to the preceding analysis, it was
desirable with suggestions for future improvement on the governance of NIBOR.
A. Research question
Norges Bank has on several occasions pointed out weaknesses in NIBOR. In their letter to Fi-
nanstilsynet (2014), they point out that the NIBOR banks’ individual contribution vary without
obvious logical patterns. Bernhardsen, Kloster and Syrstad (2012) pointed to the fact that NIBOR
had been high relative to STIBOR when the financial situation in the eurozone was uneasy, which
seems abnormal as the economic condition in Europe should affect the Norwegian and Swedish in-
terbank rates equally. Kyrre Aamdal (2014), a representative of one of the panel banks, rationalise
these differences by claiming that the banks must obey the laws of covered interest rate parity
between the interest rate in Norway and interest rates in other currencies. He illustrated this by
swapping NIBOR and STIBOR to euro, and thereby comparing it with EURIBOR. Syrstad u.a.
(2014) responded that Aamdal does not risk adjust the alternatives, and that the NIBOR panel
banks wrongly let the euro-specific risk be directly incorporated in the NIBOR rate.
Figure 2 compares the various interest rates across countries over time. Even after swapping
NIBOR and STIBOR using spot and forward exchange rates, the graph to the right in figure 2
clearly shows a discrepancy between NIBOR and other interbank rates. The difference between
rates seems to be persistent even after the period of financial unease referred to by both Bernhard-
sen et. al and Aamdal. This discrepancy is the foundation for our examination of the dynamics of
NIBOR.
The paper’s first research question will address NIBOR in a broader sense. We aim to determine
the validity of NIBOR in an international perspective by looking at the relationship between NIBOR
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Figure 2. Cross-country interbank rates
and other sources of market information, and determine how the funding cost for the banks is
reflected in the interest rates.
1. Does NIBOR represent the true lending cost in the Norwegian interbank market?
Although international reference rates such as NIBOR, STIBOR and EURIBOR all represent the
same short interest rate for unsecured funding in their respective currencies, their governance and
fixings are quite different. This give rise to our second research question, which relates to the fixing
structure.
2. How does the structure and governance of NIBOR effect the participants contribution to the
interest rate?
B. Paper structure
The paper is divided into two main chapters, one for each research question. The first perspec-
tive will examine the NIBOR fixing, while the second perspective will decompose the fixing into
the individual quotes, and thereby look at the microstructure of the interest rate.
By evaluating and estimating two models for the yield curve of NIBOR, STIBOR and EURI-
BOR across maturities and time, we can compare the time variant dynamics. A continuous yield
curve model can be compared to historical bond data for the NIBOR, STIBOR and EURIBOR
panel banks. We hypothesize that corporate bonds issued by panel banks have the same risk dy-
namics as the interbank rates, and evaluate if NIBOR and STIBOR reflect the lending costs in the
corporate bond market.
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The second chapter extends the analysis by looking at the microstructure of NIBOR. This sec-
tion explores the relationship between Norwegian interbank market risk, proxied by credit default
swap prices, and the individual interest rate quotes to see whether the structure and governance of
the interest rate makes it reflect domestic credit risk. In the extension, it explores whether there
are interesting cross bank characteristics with regards to the relationship between domestic risk
and the interest rates. Finally, we look at the behavior of banks on an intraday basis, to examine
whether there seem to be a mutual understanding of what affects the short term development of
the interest rate.
The common denominator for the analysis will be to draw inference about NIBOR by examining
other sources of market information such as bond data, STIBOR, EURIBOR, credit default swaps
for the panel banks and high frequency microdata for NIBOR. The paper seeks to answer the un-
derlying research question by utilising proxies for risk present in the interbank market, and thereby
draw inference about NIBOR. Based on this analysis we will make suggestions for improving NI-
BOR during our concluding remarks, and for future research that might expand the understanding
of interest rates, and especially the Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate.
C. Out of scope
To limit the extensiveness and to enable a comprehensive evaluation of the Norwegian interbank
rates, we have made some limitations to the scope of the paper. From a large sample of available
interbank rates, we chose to use STIBOR and EURIBOR as relevant comparable interest rates for
unsecured loans. Other closely related interbank rates are the US dollar LIBOR in London, and
CIBOR for Danish krone in Copenhagen. There are two important aspects of LIBOR making it
unsuitable in this paper. The somewhat turbulent and controversial fixing habits during the last
decade create a bias and uncertainty regarding the validity of LIBOR itself. In addition, LIBOR
by definition is a borrowing rate, whereas both NIBOR and EURIBOR are lending rates. As the
Danish krone has been a part of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism since 1999, the Danish
central bank ensures the exchange rate does not deviate more than ±2.25% (Nationalbank, 2009).
This makes CIBOR superfluous to the superior European interbank rate.
D. Data sources
The primary data sources for the paper are Oslo Børs ASA, Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg.
In addition to the primary data sources, additional information and data has been provided from
panel banks regarding guarantees for bonds and insight to the fixing process, and Finance Norway
regarding NIBOR regulations.
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High frequency data (indicative deposit rates) for NIBOR with maturities 1 week, 1 month, 2
months, 3 months and 6 months has been supplied by Oslo Børs ASA, and was acquired 18.09.2015
with financial support from Finance Norway.
Historical fixing data for NIBOR, STIBOR and EURIBOR and currency exchange rates has
been acquired from Thomson Reuters Datastream between 21.10.2015 and 10.12.2015. The un-
derlying official sources for the interbank rates are Norges Bank for NIBOR, Stockholm Cham-
ber of Commerce for STIBOR, and EBF - European Banking Federation/ACI - The Financial
Markets Association for EURIBOR. The source for NOK/EUR and SEK/EUR exchange rates is
WM/Reuters. Bond data has been gathered from Thomson Reuters Datastream between 20.10.2015
and 15.12.2015, and there is no underlying source for bond data beyond Reuters. Prices are obtained
using Thomson Reuters Pricing Service for daily pricing, and the extracted prices are Thomson
Reuters Price Service Evaluated Bid (TRPB). TRPB are considered to be end of day bid prices,
and a more detailed explanation of TRPB is available in the Datastream Fixed Income Content
information guide (2011). Treasury bill data for the currencies NOK, EUR and SEK has been
acquired from Thomson Reuters Datastream between 20.10.2015 and 10.12.2015, and the source is
Thomson Reuters. Prices are denoted as government bond indices calculated by Thomson Reuters.
Detailed explanation of how the indices are calculated is available in the Thomson Reuters Gov-
ernment Bond Indices user guide (2013), and quoted prices are considered as annualized interest
rates.
Credit default swap prices were supplied with the help from one of the panel banks on 26.11.2015,
where the original source is Bloomberg. Due to strict limitations on credit default swap data, the
quotes were supplied in graphs. The values were extracted from the graphs using measuring tools in
Adobe Illustrator R©. This ensured that the data extracted was as exact as possible. The extraction
resulted in potentially small deviations, but the magnitude of the deviation is small compared to
the size of the prices measured.
Before transforming and altering the data for more useful purposes, descriptive statistics for
the original unedited data will be presented.
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III. Descriptive statistics
To introduce the data material used in the paper, some descriptive statistics and highlights of
key characteristics are presented for the interbank rates, fixing quotes, indicative deposit rates, bond
prices and credit default swaps. Cross-country data will be presented first, containing information
about NIBOR, STIBOR, EURIBOR, exchange rates and bonds in a broader perspective. After
presenting the data for interbank rates in a global context, we will dig deeper into the data regarding
individual NIBOR panel banks and the fixing process of NIBOR.
A. Cross-country data
In the paper, we have used historical data for the current maturities and previously discontinued
maturities for NIBOR, STIBOR and EURIBOR. This includes tomorrow-next, 1 week, 2 weeks, 3
weeks, and 1-12 months, depending on the availability. The complete sample period is exactly 15
years, from 20.10.2000 to 20.10.2015. The sample is divided into two components: in-sample esti-
mation and out-of-sample forecast for evaluation. The in-sample period is 20.10.2000 to 28.04.2015,
which leaves 125 observations for the out-of-sample forecast.
Table I Descriptive statistics for structure of the interbank rates
NIBOR STIBOR EURIBOR
Loan type Offered unsecured Offered unsecured Offered unsecured
interbank loan interbank loan interbank loan
Current 1W 1M 2M T/N 1W 1M 1W 2W 1M 2M
maturities 3M 6M 2M 3M 6M 3M 6M 9M 1Y
Discontinued T/N 2W 9M 3W 4M 5M 7M
maturities 9M 1Y 1Y 8M 10M 11M
Number of panel banks 6 6 24
Note: Some interbank rates have changed panel banks during the period.
In table I we have summarized relevant information regarding the availability of maturities for
the various interbank rates. All interbank rates have decreased the number of quoted maturities
during the period 20.10.2000 to 28.04.2015. Unconventional maturities have been dropped over
the last years, and the most common maturities are 1 week, 1 month, 2 months, 3 months and
6 months. There is a considerable difference between EURIBOR and NIBOR/STIBOR regarding
number of contributing banks, as EURIBOR reflects the interbank rate across the whole Economic
and Monetary Union.
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Table II displays NIBOR decomposed for the individual maturities, and equivalent tables for
STIBOR and EURIBOR are presented in table XXIX and XXX, appendix A.A. Interestingly, the
average interest rate for maturity tomorrow-next is higher than almost all other maturities. As
there have been changes in the number of maturities during the time period, this representation of
the descriptive statistics for NIBOR do not tell the whole story. To get a feeling of the behavior
of the average yield curve for NIBOR we have divided the sample into different periods dependent
on when maturities were excluded from NIBOR, and the average interest rates for the periods
are shown in table III. We observe that for the two most recent periods the yield curve is strictly
increasing and concave.
Table II Descriptive statistics for NIBOR
Maturity(months) Time Period (obs) Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
T/N 20.10.2000 - 18.11.2011 4.04 2.05 0.57 9.37
(2891)
1 Week 20.10.2000 - 28.04.2015 3.38 2.03 1.28 9.1
(3788)
2 Week 20.10.2000 - 30.12.2013 3.66 2.02 1.49 8.25
(3442)
1 Month 20.10.2000 - 28.04.2015 3.42 2.02 1.25 9.13
(3788)
2 Month 20.10.2000 - 28.04.2015 3.46 2.01 1.25 8.46
(3788)
3 Month 20.10.2000 - 28.04.2015 3.51 1.99 1.21 7.91
(3788)
6 Month 20.10.2000 - 28.04.2015 3.60 1.95 1.15 7.95
(3788)
9 Month 20.10.2000 - 30.12.2013 3.96 1.86 1.66 7.79
(3442)
1 Year 20.10.2000 - 30.12.2013 4.05 1.81 1.72 7.9
(3442)
Note: Number of observations in parentheses.
Table III Descriptive statistics for each sub period, NIBOR
Period T/N 1W 2W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y
20.10.2000 - 18.11.2011 4.04 4.00 4.03 4.04 4.06 4.12 4.20 4.27 4.35
21.11.2011 - 30.12.2013 1.76 1.80 1.88 1.95 2.05 2.24 2.36 2.48
31.12.2013 - 28.04.2015 1.56 1.57 1.60 1.63 1.65
For STIBOR and EURIBOR the average interest rate curve is similar to NIBOR, and the aver-
age interest rates are lower than NIBOR for the same maturities. The trend for all interest rates is
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decreasing variation as time to maturity increases, which is expected as we know long term yields
are more persistent.
In total, the panel banks for NIBOR, STIBOR and EURIBOR issued several thousand bonds
during the period 20.10.2000 to 20.10.2015. This sample was substantially reduced after removing
index linked, floating rate, graduate rate, and complex coupon bonds. The sample was further
decreased, as some pricing data for earlier periods were unreliable due to lack of accurate prices
or lack of liquidity in the bond market. All bonds are confirmed to be unsecured senior loans by
either Thomson Reuters, Bloomberg or the panel banks. As the underlying risk is very important
when comparing the unsecured interbank rate against other sources of data, we have excluded any
bonds where we have been unable to confirm if the bonds are senior uncovered.
Table IV summarizes the total number of bonds from each bank, and the distribution of bonds
used over banks and across years. The number of bonds are aggregated across the currencies NOK,
SEK and EUR. The distribution across the years from 2010 to 2015 is sufficient, however there are
large variations between banks, which is a weakness of the data set. Three European banks have
been included in our data set, Barclays, Deutsche Bank and ING Bank, which will be discussed in
greater detail during the evaluation of the bond data. The European banks provide a substantially
larger sample of bonds than the Nordic banks.
Table IV Distribution of bonds across banks and years
Bank/Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total Out-of-sample
DNB 0 7 1 0 2 2 12
Nordea 0 4 7 0 1 1 13 6
Handelsbanken 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
SEB 0 2 1 0 1 0 4 3
Swedbank 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
Danske Bank 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 4
Barclays 0 1 6 5 7 4 23
Deutsche Bank 8 6 1 2 3 1 21
ING Bank 0 3 3 2 1 1 10
Total 8 24 19 11 16 9 87 13
Note: 2015 matures before 28.04.2015. Out-of-sample matures after 20.10.2015.
In table V the bond data has been sorted based on currency, and we observe that the NIBOR
banks have issued far more unsecured bonds in euros than NOK and SEK from 2010 to 2015. This
is not a representative currency distribution for corporate bonds in general, as covered corporate
bonds are not included. We use bonds with zero coupon when maturity is after the in-sample
period, shown in the right column in table V. The out-of-sample bonds will be used separately when
applying a secondary framework. Bonds will be referred to by the Reuters ID number throughout
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the paper. The ID can be used to identify the issuer, ISIN-identification number, coupon, currency
and maturity date. A complete list of bonds is available in table XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII and
XXXIV in appendix A.A.
Table V Distribution of bonds across banks and years
Currency/Characteristics Fixed coupon Zero coupon Average coupon Total no. bonds
NOK 6 1 5,4% 7
SEK 3 2 3,4% 5
EUR NIBOR banks 15 6 3,6% 21
EUR EURIBOR banks 41 13 3,1% 54
EUR out-of-sample 0 13 0% 13
Note: Aggregate across years.
B. NIBOR quotes
Our statistics on the individual quotes underlying the NIBOR fixing are daily observations
dating back to 01.10.2012 across all maturities, except for the one week maturity which date back
to 09.12.2013. Table VI presents a brief summary of the NIBOR fixings across maturities. We will
when appropriate use the abbreviation DDB for Danske Bank, DNM for DNB, NDA for Nordea,
SEB for SEB, SHB for Handelsbanken and SWD for Swedbank, as these are the formal abbreviations
used by Oslo Børs.
Table VI Summary NIBOR fixing quotes, averages
interest rate Time period(obs) Fixing Max Min Max/Min spread
1 week 09.12.2013 - 21.11.2015 1.44 1.51 1.38 0.13
(490) (0.224) (0.0566)
1 month 01.10.2012 - 21.11.2015 1.55 1.60 1.51 0.09
(789) (0.219) (0.0304)
2 month 01.10.2012 - 21.11.2015 1.58 1.62 1.55 0.07
(789) (0.2203) (0.0278)
3 month 01.10.2012 - 21.11.2015 1.61 1.66 1.59 0.07
(789) (0.228) (0.0262)
6 month 01.10.2012 - 21.11.2015 1.68 1.72 1.63 0.08
(789) (0.286) (0.030)
Note: Observations and standard errors in parentheses.
Observe from VI that there does not seem to be any differences in the volatility across ma-
turities. Individual quotes suggest that the spread between the maximum and minimum quotes
is higher for short maturities than long maturities. Within our panel, this has been especially
prevailing for the one week rate, but also to some extent for the one week rate. The spread has
however been reduced in 2015 for the short maturities, and plots of spreads across maturities are
available in figure 24 in appendix A.B. Note that this spread is not directly reflected in the interest
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rate in table VI as the highest and lowest values are discarded when fixing NIBOR.
Looking closer at the highest and lowest quotes, there seem to be some consistency in the
relative level of the interest rate across the participants’ contributions. Figure 3 shows the aggregate
distribution across maturities of banks having the highest and lowest quote. The high end of the
scale is mostly dominated by DDB which accounts for the highest quote roughly 60% of the time.
The only exception is the one week rate, where DNM is most frequently the highest bidder. On the
opposite side of the scale, the most dominant low bidder is SHB with an average of 40%. SHB is
hence not as dominant on the low side as DDB is on the high side. Both SWD and SEB take turns
being the most frequent low bidder dependent on maturity. The distribution divided by maturities
may be found in figure 25 and 26 in appendix A.B.
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Figure 3. Note: Aggregate distribution of highest/lowest quotes divided by banks.
C. Indicative Deposit Rates
The indicative deposit rates were implemented 09.12.2013, and the data ranges from its intro-
duction until 22.09.2015. Adjusting for reporting errors, we are left with roughly twenty thousand
observations for each maturity. Observe from table VII that 6 month NIBOR is the only maturity
with significantly more observations than other maturities. It has roughly thirty percent more
changes. Observe also that the size of changes are relatively stable around one basis point, with
quite heavy outliers connected with big economic events like key interest rate meetings. Within
each of the maturities, the frequency distribution among the panel banks seem fairly constant. The
common trend across all maturities is that NDA most frequently change their interest rates with
roughly 30% of the total, and SWD being the least active with roughly 6%. Other panel banks
fluctuate in the range of 10% to 20% of the total. Summary statistics on the relative frequency
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among individual banks may be found in table XXXV appendix A.C.
Table VII Summary Indicative Deposit Rates
interest rate Time period(obs) avg.obs/day Mean change Max increase Max decrease
1 week 09.12.2013 - 22.09.2015 43.29 ±0.01239 0.27 -0.27
(21213) (0.0179)
1 month 09.12.2013 - 22.09.2015 44.83 ±0.011 0.35 -0.3
(21967) (0.0148)
2 month 09.12.2013 - 22.09.2015 41.67 ±0.010 0.31 -0.28
(20420) (0.014)
3 month 09.12.2013 - 22.09.2015 42.14 ±0.010 0.3 -0.26
(20649) (0.0163)
6 month 09.12.2013 - 22.09.2015 56.60 ±0.0105 0.28 -0.28
(27737) (0.0138)
Note: Number of observations and standard errors in parentheses.
From the frequency distribution for changes to the left in figure 4 the common trend is a peak
during the two opening hours followed by a steady decline throughout the day. The activity in the
last hour before the fixing seem to be reduced, while the activity during the last hour of the day is
significantly lower than for the rest of the day. A summary of the aggregate frequency distribution
across maturities may be found in figure 27 in appendix A.C. Knowing what the distribution of
changes look like, another interesting property to examine is the size of the changes. As the index
is operating at a two decimal accuracy level, any change must be least one basis point. Hence, a
vast majority of the changes is one basis point in either direction as illustrated in the right figure
4. The distribution of change sizes across maturities may be found figure 28 appendix A.C.
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Figure 4. Empirical distribution properties of IDR quotes
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D. Credit default swap spreads
The credit default swap (CDS) spreads are weekly observations dating back to 01.10.2012.
These derivatives express the price of insuring a senior corporate bond from defaulting within one
year. In other words, to insure 100 $ from defaulting within one year for any of the panel banks,
you will need to pay 100 $ multiplied with the spread for the given bank. We have credit default
swaps across all banks except Nordea, which was not available until late 2015. Nordea is thereby
left out of the part of the analysis where the CDS spreads are utilised.
From the CDS spread development over time in figure 5 we observe that the spreads were
significantly higher during the first part of our sample. Especially in the period preceding February
2013. While this could probably be attributed to macroeconomic factors, properties within banks,
and a persistent aftershock of the credit crisis, bear in mind that there was not nearly such a
difference in the spread across reported interest rates with respect to neither maturities nor time.
A summary of the CDS spreads across time and banks may be found in appendix A.D. Regarding
the individual characteristics, observe from figure 5 that SHB dominates having the lowest CDS
spread, similarly they also dominated having the lowest interest rate bid. On the top side however,
there is seemingly no consistency in having the highest spread, and Danske Bank is not nearly as
dominant as with their reported rates.
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IV. Chapter 1: Dynamics of interest rates
In this chapter, we wish to investigate the dynamics of NIBOR by exploring how the inter-
est rate behaves across maturities and time, and how interest rates vary between currencies. In
section II the interest rates across currencies were compared, and we observe differences between
the swapped interest rate that we could not explain. This raises two important questions: Does
NIBOR accurately reflect the lending cost in the Norwegian money market? The NIBOR panel
banks state that foreign currency is the primary liquidity source. Does the swap rate reflect the
financing cost in a foreign currency money market?
We will try to answer the first question by identifying how the Norwegian and foreign interbank
rates behave across maturities and time, and continue by finding common factors that influence
the interbank rates. Identifying the behavior of NIBOR and the country specific factors will help
us determine the accuracy of NIBOR as a Norwegian money market lending rate. By comparing
the identified factors against observable financing cost, we can evaluate if the interbank rates are
consistent with market data. To answer the second question, we will compare interbank rates across
countries under a common currency to identify variations not caused by currency differences. To
elaborate on these two important questions, we will need to take a step back to our interpretation
of what interest rates really are. Why do interest rates vary across countries, and how can we
capture these dynamics in a financial framework?
A. A brief history of interest rate theory
Since the modern interpretation of banking and the bond market arose during the 11th century
in today’s Italy, the importance of interest rate has become imminent. During the last century,
there has been extensive research and contributions to our understanding of interest rates. Since
the rise of modern derivative pricing theory by Black, Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973), interest
rate dynamics have become more meaningful due to the importance of the existence of a risk-free
asset, and for modern bond portfolio management. During this time economists understood that
an asset with no default risk is not necessarily risk-free, it is still exposed to interest rate risk
tied to the assets’ underlying interest rate dynamics. There exists two important frameworks in
financial economics, which are applicable to understanding interest rate dynamics: the no-arbitrage
approach and equilibrium approach. The equilibrium approach has its roots to the Arrow-Debrew
equilibrium model (1954), and notable contributors are Vasicek (1977) and Cox, Ingersoll and
Ross (CIR) (1985). The first no-arbitrage framework for interest rates was introduced by Ho and
Lee (1986), and other notable contributors have been Hull and White (1990) who were the minds
behind the extended Vasicek model consistent with no arbitrage. Heath, Jarrow and Morton (1992)
generalized this through defining an explicit relationship between the drift and volatility for the
short-rate dynamics consistent with no-arbitrage. For the most common models, the innovation of
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the short-rate can all be generalized with
dr(t) = k(θ(t, r(t))− r(t))dt+ r(t)σ(t, r(t))dWt, (6)
where r(t) is the short-rate at time t, θ is the long term trend, k is the mean reversion speed, σ is the
short-rate volatility, and Wt is geometric Brownian Motion. By imposing different assumptions for
the dynamics of each component, we can derive all the one-factor Gaussian models mentioned above.
Both the no-arbitrage and equilibrium framework build on fundamental assumptions about the
short-rate consistent with some variation of the stochastic differential equation above. In 1987 an
alternative approach was introduced by Nelson and Siegel (1987). They recognized the demand
for identifying a simple model to represent a wide variety of yield curve shapes using different
components for long, medium and short term yields. Nelson and Siegel presented a model for
approximating the yield curve, with characteristics dynamic enough to incorporate increasing,
decreasing and S-formed yield curves. Nelson and Siegel started in many ways in the opposite
end of Vasicek and Cox by addressing what parametric model fits the yield data we actually have.
The model has its roots from beliefs about the short-rate, but the underlying framework is not as
complex as those presented by scholars before them are. After specifying the model, they asked
themselves how the model fit with financial theory of the yield curve. The parametric model was
empirically tested by Litterman, Scheinkman and Knez (1991; 1994) who identified that the three
common factors could explain a substantial amount of variation in bond yields. The model was
later refined for better economic interpretation and popularized by Diebold and Li (2006).
B. The yield curve
To make the models and results more applicable across securities, we will operate with yields
instead of interest rates. Our definition of yield is the annualized total rate of return on a security.
For interbank rates this corresponds to the interest rate offered to the interbank market, and for
bonds it is the rate of return, which is given by the market price.
As financial interest bearing instruments both vary in structure (cash flow payments, coupon
characteristics) and in time (maturity), they must be standardized by introducing a yield curve.
As the offer rates for various currencies such as NIBOR, STIBOR and EURIBOR are all observable
in the market, they can be converted to represent yields. By representing our interest rates using
the yield curve, we can apply all the mentioned frameworks. The no-arbitrage framework by per-
fectly fitting the yield curve to observed data to prevent arbitrage, and the equilibrium framework
to model the dynamics of the short-rate and deriving yields for other maturities by introducing
some assumption about the markets risk premium. Lastly, we can use the yield observations to
calibrate our parametric model to derive the time-varying factors, and later apply an autoregressive
framework for the factors themselves.
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C. Choice of framework
As mentioned, there are numerous models to choose from. In this paper, we have chosen to
apply the model introduced by Nelson and Siegel, and the quilibrium model introduced by Vasicek.
There are three key reasons that we chose not to apply any of the no-arbitrage models, which
are widely used and certainly would be applicable in this case. The financial interbank market is
definitely efficient enough to impose no arbitrage restrictions, however, our first reason for discarding
this approach is the poor forecasting and empirical characteristics (especially out-of-sample) of the
models, which has been pointed out in many previous papers (when applied to bond yields) (Duffee,
2002; Christensen u.a., 2011). Our second reason for not using a no-arbitrage model is that no-
arbitrage restrictions can be incorporated into the Nelson-Siegel model, as shown by Christensen,
Diebold and Rudebusch (2011) who introduce an affine arbitrage-free Nelson-Siegel model. Lastly,
many of the no-arbitrage frameworks contain parameters that change over time, such as the Hull
& White model with time dependent long term equilibrium. In many cases, this introduces a new
stochastic differential equation and additional parameters, which increases the complexity of the
model. Our second choice is the Vasicek model introduced in 1977. This model is commonly used
in interest rate theory, and is a one-factor model with a few assumptions regarding the dynamics
of the short-rate. There are several reasons for choosing the Vasicek framework; it is a one-factor
model with few parameters, which makes it viable for few maturities. It portraits very similar
characteristics as the Nelson-Siegel model which is convenient when comparing performance and
results, and allows for negative interest rates.
Despite the differences between our two frameworks, there are fundamental building blocks,
which are common for all interest rate models - modern interest rate theory.
D. Modern interest rate theory
An important concept when addressing interest rates is the short-rate, or instantaneous interest
rate r(t). The literature often uses the terminology instantaneous (nominal) forward rate, which
is equivalent to short-rate. We define r(t) as the interest rate on a risk-free asset between t and
t+ dt. Thus we can define the innovation of a bank account B(t) equal to
dB(t) = r(t)B(t)dt, (7)
and with the boundary condition B(0) = 0, the value of a bank account B(t) can be expressed as
B(t) = e−
∫ T
t r(s) ds. (8)
Let P (t) be the price of a zero coupon bond maturing at time T . Our formal definition for bond
yields ytT , by simply discounting gains, is
P (t) = P (T )e−ytT (T−t) (9)
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Thus we can elaborate on the relationship between the zero coupon bonds yield and the expansion
of the short-rate by pricing 1 $ at time t to be paid at time T using (8) and (9)
e−ytT (T−t) = e−
∫ T
t r(s) ds,
ytT =
1
T − t
∫ T
t
r(s)ds, (10)
and establish a relationship between the yield ytT and the future short-rate r(t). To further elabo-
rate on the expansion of the yield curve we must impose some assumptions regarding the dynamics
of the short-rate. The Nelson-Siegel model expresses the yield curve directly as a function of a set
of parameters and time to maturity. Using this yield curve model we can trace the assumptions
regarding the short rate. The Vasicek model denote the change in short-rate as a stochastic differ-
ential equation, and we can derive the short-rate and yield curve from this.
For valuation of bonds, we will use a simple framework for cash flow valuation to express bond
values as yields. As bonds are not continuously compounded, we will use the discrete version of
the yield model
Pt =
100
(1 + yt)t
. (11)
This allows us to calculate yield curve for bonds after adjusting for accrued interest (European
30/360 which is the most common day count conversion for bonds in euros).
E. Function based yield curve model
The function based yield curve model introduced by Nelson and Siegel (1987) and adjusted
by Diebold and Li (2006; 2006) aims to approximate the yield curve using three factors which are
financially sensible. The three-factor model aims to express the future short-rate using a parametric
yield curve for modeling and forecasting. Diebold and Li expresses the yield curve using a Laguerre
function with a constant:
yt(T ) = β1t + β2t
(
1− e−λtT
λtT
)
+ β3t
(
1− e−λtT
λtT
− e−λtT
)
(12)
The specification above is popular for mathematical approximation (Francis X. Diebold u.a., 2006),
and allows for non-linearities in the yield curve. In the model we have three factors, β1t, β2t, β3t,
and a decay parameter λt which determines the magnitude of the exponential decay rate. The
three factors have been investigated by Litterman (1991) and by Diebold, and is commonly used
by institutional financial organizations such as the IMF (Gasha u.a., 2010), ECB (Modugno u.a.,
2009), Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (Diebold u.a., 2006). We can interpret the factors
β1, β2 and β3 as level, steepness and curvature.
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Litterman and Diebold’s approaches to evaluating the accuracy of the model are different, but
their conclusions are the same. Litterman applies modern portfolio theory to create hedged bond
portfolios that eliminate the exposure to the different factors and uses the portfolio out-of-sample to
evaluate the performance compared to a normal duration convexity-hedged portfolio. Diebold uses
ordinary least squares to estimate the factors based yield data, and an autoregressive framework
for out-of-sample forecasting. We can investigate if the model inhabits the characteristics we know
portraits yield curves by starting to identify key features for the yield curve:
1. The average yield curve is increasing and concave.
2. The yield curve can have a variety of shapes with increasing maturity, including upward and
downward sloping, humped and inverted humped.
3. The yield curve must reflect that negative interest rates may occur with probability greater
than 0.
4. We know that spread dynamics (short term) are less persistent while yield dynamics are more
persistent (long term).
The model does satisfy the shapes mentioned in 1 and 2 as ∂yt(T )
2
∂2T
> 0, yt(T ) can exhibit con-
cavity and the property ∂yt(T )∂T > 0 depending on the specification of βt2 and βt3. Unlike interest
models such as the CIR-model, this approach allows for negative interest rates, which is important
due to the current interest level in the eurozone. To understand more of the dynamics in the
model, and the economic interpretation of β1, β2, and β3 it is useful to examine the behavior of
the three factors for different conditions of yt(T ). When we approach maturity 0, we can see that
yt(0) = β1t + β2t, and is the initial level for all yields regardless of maturity. This can be inter-
preted as the initial market premium required for lending money in the interbank market, before
addressing any time contingent premium. When T →∞, yt(∞) = β1t we have the long term yield.
β1 effects all yields equally across maturities. It is the only factor for long maturities, and hence
the long term level factor. Thus the three factors influence the yield curves differently; β1, the level
factor effects the yield on long term, β2, the slope factor effects the yield on medium term, while
β3, the curvature factor effects the yield on short term.
To expand on the assumptions on the short-rate rt in the model, we can derive the relationship
between the short-rate and the yield curve. Let t = 0, and thus
yt(T ) = β1t + β2t
(
1− e−λtT
λtT
)
+ β3t
(
1− e−λtT
λtT
− e−λtT
)
=
1
T
∫ T
0
r(s)ds (13)
and we can derive the process for the short-rate:
r(T ) =
d
dT
Tyt(T ) = β1t + β2te
−λtT + β3tλtTe−λtT (14)
We can see that limT→0 r(t) = β1t + β2t and limT→∞ r(t) = β1t, similarly as the yield curve. Let
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θNS be the long term trend for r(t), and r(0) = r0. Then θNS = β1t and r0 = θNS + β2t. Then our
short-rate model is
r(t) = θNS(1− e−λtt) + r0e−λt + β3tTλe−λt (15)
This is an interesting result, as this is closely related to the Vasicek model shown later, despite the
two models being derived in different ways. The two first components containing θNS and r0 are
similar, but the third element will deviate.
The Nelson-Siegel (and the modified Diebold-Li) model is fairly simple to estimate using non-
linear optimization, however a complication using this approach is over-fitting. We aim to estimate
four parameters using from 5 to 9 data points for NIBOR, which for some time periods creates
suspiciously high variance in the estimated coefficients (the other interbank rates provide us with
with more maturities on average, but do at times also lack the data to allow estimation of all four
parameters). To address this issue there are two possibilities; increase the number of maturities or
decrease the number of parameters. If we chose to increase maturities, interpolation will not create
any additional information, so the only way would be to incorporate other sources of information
such as yield data for Norwegian Treasury bills. As the underlying risks are quite different in the
interbank market and government bonds - we first try to reduce the number of parameters before
integrating additional data. It is popular in the literature to fix the decay parameter λt (Nelson
u.a., 1987; Francis X. Diebold u.a., 2006), which determines at what maturity the loading on the
curvature is at its maximum. When we ran the estimation for all four parameter, we can get a
ballpark feeling of what value is fitting for the decay parameter. Diebold argues that λt = 0.0609,
however we expect a higher decay parameter as we are working with far shorter maturities than
for government bonds. Using a sample of 200 observations, after removing extreme results, we
estimate λ to be 0.1157. A second argument for using a deterministic decay parameter is how this
simplifies and increases the robustness of our solution. This is shown by looking a bit closer in the
estimation technique we have to use if all four parameters are estimated - non-linear least squares.
In appendix B.A we have derived the theoretical solution to our optimization problem, and from
the Hessian matrix the problem is vastly simplified by fixing λt. This does influence the dynamics
of the model, but as we do not know the behaviour of our yield curve outside the neighbourhood
of the optimal solution, it is hard to evaluate if this is the global minimum.
The most useful application of the Nelson-Siegel model is our ability to model a continuous
yield curve across both time and maturities. This allows us to compute a yield curve that matches
instruments in real life, where prices fluctuate due to time-varying factors and decreasing time to
maturity. Another possible approach is to model the interest rates themselves, which brings us to
the stochastic short-rate model, where we identify characteristics for each maturity individually.
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F. Stochastic short-rate model
Our second model will be an equilibrium-based framework. The choice of framework was intro-
duced by Vasicek in 1977, and describes the future short-rate as a stochastic differential equation,
which exhibits a set of properties: the future short-rate is only effected by a long term interest
rate level θ, a decay parameter k, the volatility of the interest rate σ and a normally distributed
Brownian Motion Wt. The Vasicek model is a special case of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, and
is both Gaussian (normally distributed) and Markovian (E[rt] = E[rt|rt−1] ∀ t). The stochastic
differential equation for the model is
drt = k(θ − rt)dt+ σdWt (16)
This equation has an explicit solution for rt which can be derived using stochastic calculus (and
changing to more convenient notation). Let dr(t) = k(θ − r(t))dt + σdW (t) and introduce the
transformation f(t, r(t)) = r(t)ekt. By Ito’s lemma we can derive the stochastic differential equation
which is done through several steps shown in appendix B.B. After deriving the expectation and
variance, we can derive the corresponding yield curve
y(T ) =
1− e−kT
kt
r0 +
(
1− 1− e
−kT
kt
)
θ − 1
2
(σ
k
)2(
1− 21− e
−kT
kT
+
1− e−2kT
2kT
)
(17)
As mentioned, the Vasicek and Nelson-Siegel yield curves are surprisingly similar, however in
the Vasicek model we are able to incorporate the dispersion element expressed by a Wiener process.
Using L’Hoˆpital’s rule we can evaluate the limits of y(T ). ddx(1− e−kT ) = ke−kT and limT → 0
y(T ) is equal to r0, and for limT → ∞ y(T ) is equal to θ − σ22k2 . Interestingly, the long term yield
is not equal to the long term interest rate, but is dependent on the volatility of the short-rate and
the decay parameter k.
G. Time series
When working with observations in the interest and bond market, we are working with time
series. Time series require more caution than working with time invariant data, as violations to
the Gauss-Markov theorem (Plackett, 1950) for linear estimation techniques for static observations
is arguably not as problematic as violations to the fundamentals for time series, such as the same
Gauss-Markov theorem for time series and stationarity.
A problem when working with time series is non-stationary data, which can lead to spurious
results. A series can be characterized as stationary if we can conclude that ρ < 1 for yt = ρyt−1 +t.
For yield estimation, this is not a problem, as the corresponding yield curves are estimated across
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maturities, not time. This must however be addressed for the factors β1, β2 and β3 in the Nelson-
Siegel model, and θ, k and σ in the Vasicek model as we want to understand the dynamics of
these factors over time. A time series is non-stationary if it contains a unit root. Series containing
unit root is characterised by being permanently effected by stochastic shocks. The most common
tests for unit root is Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (1979) and the Phillips-Perron test (1988).
Stationarity will be adressed using an unrestricted Augmented Dickey-Fuller test correcting for
serial correlation with appropriate number of lags
∆yt = α+ βyt−1 +
n∑
i=1
δi∆yt−i + εt. (18)
A linear relationship between different time series elements is popular to approximate some real
world representation of data. Linear frameworks are composed of one or many of the fundamental
building blocks for time series analysis; a moving average process describes a stochastic process
which is equal to a weighted sum of past stochastic elements. An MA(q) process can be written
as yt = y0 +
q∑
i=1
Aiεt−i + εt. An autoregressive process describes the current value of a time series
yt as a function of weighted past values and past stochastic elements. Thus an AR(p) process is
expressed as yt = y0 +
p∑
i=1
Bjyt−j + εt. By combining these elements, we can express a time series
as an ARMA(p,q) model. When working with a set of time series, the model can be constructed as
a vectorized autoregressive model, VARMA, to account for indirect effects between the series, and
the yt becomes a vector. If we wish to incorporate additional exogenous factors in our VARMA
model, we can express the relationship between current values as a general VARMAX model
Yt = α+ βXt +
p∑
i=1
AiYt−i +
q∑
j=1
Bjεt−j + εt, (19)
Where α is a constant, β is the the coefficent for the exogenous factor Xt, and each Ai is a 3 × 3
matrix with the autoregressive effects from lag Yt−i, while each Bj is a 3× 3 matrix for the moving
average components for εt−i.
In addition to our theoretical frameworks for the short-rate and yield to evaluate the accuracy
of the interbank rates, we need tools to evaluate the precision of the models themselves.
H. Model evaluation
There are several tools and techniques to evaluate the goodness of performance for a linear
or non-linear model. R-squared and adjusted R-squared which is commonly used in econometrics
is a naive approach to performance evaluation, as it does not penalize an increase in independent
variables, and tends to be a poor indicator for the performance of the model. The two most common
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measures for forecast performance and accuracy are Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) and Mean
Absolute Error (MAE), and will be used to compare the accuracy of each model, and their relative
performance (Hyndman u.a., 2006).
RMSE =
n∑
i=1
√
(yˆ − y)2
N
(20)
MAE =
n∑
i=1
|yˆ − y|
N
(21)
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V. Chapter 1: Evaluating interbank rates in foreign and
domestic currency
Recall that we wanted to determine whether NIBOR accurately represents the true lending
rate for the panel banks. The Nelson-Siegel model will be used to estimate three currency specific
factors and allows us to construct the entire yield curve. The yield curve can then be compared
to historical bond prices in domestic and foreign currency. The Vaiscek model will be applied to
understand dynamics of the interbank rates over time, and check if the they are consistent with
current prices in the bond market.
A. Applying the Nelson-Siegel model
The first approach for estimating a continuous yield curve for each interest rate is the Nelson-
Siegel model. To model the yield curve, we have estimated an ordinary least squares regression for
each day given by
yt,INTERBANK = yt(T ) = β1t + β2t
(
1− e−λˆtT
λˆtT
)
+ β3t
(
1− e−λˆtT
λˆtT
− e−λˆtT
)
. (22)
Randomly selected dates have been plotted with corresponding estimated yield curve which are
available in appendix C.A. The sample of dates covers different yield curve structures and fits the
data across time. The sample of yield curves shows that the Nelson-Siegel model is a good fit, and
that we are able to reproduce a variety of yield curve structures.
Figure 6, 7 and 8 illustrates the estimated yield curve across both time and maturity. By ap-
plying the Nelson-Siegel model for each interbank rate separately, we end up with three factors,
which are country (currency) specific. The exact estimated factors have been plotted in figure 32,
33 and 34 available in appendix C.B. Using the estimated factors, we represent the development
of the yield curve across time for each interbank rate in figure 6, 7 and 8. From the figures, we
observe that the changes in yield over maturity are not very large, however this is expected as the
maturity horizon is only 6 months.
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Figure 6. Estimated yield curve for NIIBOR over time and maturity.
Figure 7. Estimated yield curve for STIBOR over time and maturity.
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Figure 8. Estimated yield curve for EURIBOR over time and maturity.
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The average factor loadings are summarized in Table VIII, and from the estimated β1 coef-
ficients we observe prominent variations in NIBOR compared to STIBOR and EURIBOR. The
difference in β1 tells us two things: the estimated average interest rate when maturity approaches
zero (β1+β2) for NIBOR is almost 1.5% above EURIBOR, and the estimated average interest rate
as maturity approaches infinity (β1) is a 1.9% higher for NIBOR than EURIBOR. This is apparent
by looking at the raw interest rates themselves. Our convexity factor, β3, is different for NIBOR
compared to the other interest rates, which implies that NIBOR is less sensitive to the duration to
maturity.
Table VIII Descriptive statistics for estimated factors
Rate Factor Mean Std.Dev. ρ(1) ρ(7) ρ(30)
NIBOR β1 4,327 1,053 0,959 0,839 0,654
β2 -0,867 1,042 0,952 0,813 0,599
β3 -0,103 1,272 0,950 0,800 0,578
STIBOR β1 2,898 0,871 0,973 0,859 0,694
β2 -0,607 0,863 0,956 0,786 0,535
β3 0,595 1,041 0,959 0,781 0,545
EURIBOR β1 2,399 0,585 0,993 0,948 0,814
β2 -0,428 0,576 0,994 0,948 0,800
β3 0,881 0,715 0,994 0,950 0,825
Note: Sample is 20.10.2000-28.04.2015. ρ(k) is k’th lagged autocorrelation.
The left graph in figure 9 displays how the interest rate at zero maturity (β1+β2) behave over
time, where we observe the same deviation between NIBOR, STIBOR and EURIBOR as in figure
2 presented in the introduction. The right graph in figure 9 illustrates the average yield curve
over the whole sample, and the deviation between yields for NIBOR and STIBOR and EURIBOR
does not diminish over time. The figure is also consistent with our proposition that the average
estimated yield curve is increasing and concave.
All models exhibit an R2 between 87-97% which is expected due to the low number of obser-
vations (maturities available). In appendix C.C we dig deeper in the various interbank yield curve
residuals to evaluate how the model performs for different maturities. When comparing the yield
curve residuals to each other, we observe the Nelson-Siegel model consistently overestimates the
shortest maturity, and underestimates the longest maturity. The variation in residuals (standard
deviation) indicates a small difference between the accuracy of the NIBOR estimations and the
other reference rates, but all the models exhibit satisfactory estimation results. From MAE and
RMSE the tree models perform well, but in particular EURIBOR show signs of small prediction
errors across all maturities.
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Figure 9. Estimated level for interest rate and average yield curve
The estimated β1, β2 and β3 will serve as country specific factors which are directly comparable,
and the estimation results supports that the model accurately reflects the continuous yield curve for
the interbank rates across maturity. The accuracy of the model is vital, as the Nelson-Siegel model
will be utilised to approximate interest rates between the observable maturities in the market. The
model shows there is a significant difference between NIBOR, STIBOR and EURIBOR, but these
can be justified if it also is reflected in their funding costs.
Using the estimated factors, we can check if the domestic interbank rates are based on the do-
mestic lending costs. By matching the estimated yield curve for the interbank rate against historic
lending costs, we can examine the relationship between lending cost and offered rates.
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B. Evaluating the interbank rates in domestic currency using the Nelson-Siegel model
Recall our original definition of an interbank rate in a domestic economy using the risk-free rate
and default premium
iC,C = rfC + rpC . (23)
In a frictionless market, rfC + rpC reflects the funding cost for a panel bank in the same currency
as the interbank rate is offered. Funding costs in neither the Norwegian, Swedish nor the European
money market is directly observable for a set of maturities like the interbank rate, and thus the
funding costs must be proxied. A suitable proxy is historical bond data for the panel banks, as the
bond market is commonly used as a source for capital.
To evaluate and compare the funding costs to our interbank rates, we will use price data for
various corporate bonds issued during the 15-year period from the panel banks presented earlier in
the descriptive statistics.
One of the major problems when comparing interest rate data and market prices for bonds is
that time to maturity is different for each observation in the bond data (matures at a fixed date),
while the interest rates are expressed with the same maturity every day (matures at a variable
date). For bonds where the only observable variable is prices, it is almost impossible to isolate
what change in prices between days can be attributed to change in time to maturity, and what
is due to time-varying effects. Time-varying effects are changes in the default risk for the bank,
changes in the bond market, or fluctuations in the economy as a whole. It is not possible to address
the time-varying effect in the bonds themselves, as bond prices are only observed once for each day.
To address the time-varying effects, we must adjust the interbank yield curve using the Nelson-
Siegel model. The model allows us at any given date to express a continuous yield curve. By using
simple bond valuation to translate the bond prices into bond yields, we can directly compare them
to the Nelson-Siegel adjusted yields for interbank rates.
If we theorize about the underlying risk, we know that the domestic interbank rate can be
decomposed into both the risk-free rate and a risk premium. Identifying how these components
behave over time is complex, and quantifying the short-rate risk, expected risk-free return and de-
fault risk is challenging. To avoid identifying the underlying risk factors, we propose that they are
exactly the same for both the bonds and interbank rates. As the bonds are issued to banks in the
interbank market, and the interbank rates are offered to the same banks, they are both unsecured
loans to the same banks, and must have the same underlying risk.
In perfect frictionless markets, we know that equally risky assets must have the same price to
avoid arbitrage opportunities, and thus
iC,C = rfC + rpC := iC,C (24)
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where iC,C is the observable interbank rate, rfC is the risk-free rate, rpC is the risk premium for
the banks, and iC,C is the financing cost. It is bold to assume perfect frictionless markets, and thus
we allow for a discrepancy between the financing cost and the offered rate. By hypothesizing that
the interbank rate and the interest rate offered to the interbank market should never be lower than
the markets yield on the banks’ corporate bonds, we can check if
iC,C ≥ iC,C . (25)
In terms of yields, this translates to
yt,INTERBANK ≥ yt,BONDS . (26)
By only imposing that the interbank rate, yt,INTERBANK , is larger or equal to the bond yields,
yt,BONDS , we allow for a positive premium between the financing costs for the banks and their
offered interest rate in the interbank market. To evaluate if our hypothesized relationship between
interbank rates and financing cost holds, we approximate the interbank yield yt,INTERBANK using
the Nelson-Siegel model
yt,INTERBANK = yt(T ) = βˆ1t + βˆ2t
(
1− e−λˆtT
λˆtT
)
+ βˆ3t
(
1− e−λˆtT
λˆtT
− e−λˆtT
)
. (27)
The bond yields yt,BONDS are calculated from observable bond prices in the market adjusted for
accrued interest rate if the bonds are interest bearing instruments by
yt,BONDS =
(
100 + r(T − t)/360
Pt
) 360
T−t
− 1. (28)
In our bond valuation r denotes the bond coupon, and 360 is the most common day count con-
vention for interest bearing bonds. Note that the adjustment for accrued interest rate, r(T − t), is
a simplification of bond valuation with interest bearing characteristics. As no bonds in the sample
have higher frequency on interest payments than semi-annually, there are no payments within the
lifespan of NIBOR (up to 6 months maturity), which is our evaluation horizon. Both t, time, and
T , time to maturity, changes every day. Thus, we are able to incorporate both the time-varying
effect and the change in yield due to change in maturity using our daily estimated factor loadings
from the Nelson-Siegel model. This allows us to compare our estimated yield curve to the bond
yields.
As we want to evaluate the interbank rates in the respective domestic currencies, our sample
of banks evaluated in this section are determined by the participation in the fixing of NIBOR
to get comparable values. As some of the panel banks of Norway are also participating in the
fixing of EURIBOR and STIBOR, we can evaluate the funding costs in local currencies against the
money market rate in that given currency. Table IX provides a brief summary of which banks that
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participate in the examined interest rates, and which currency that is underlying. For transparency,
the calculated yields for the individual bonds and estimated interbank rates are plotted and available
in appendix D. Price data for the 8 bonds available in NOK is compared to NIBOR, while the sample
for STIBOR is 5 corporate bonds, and 8 for EURIBOR. The number of observations for each time
series is 120-125, depending on number of weekends and public holidays. By aggregating our
interbank and bond data, individual inconsistent pricings become less detrimental for our analysis.
Table IX Banks evaluated in the different domestic currencies.
Interbank rate NIBOR STIBOR EURIBOR
Contributing banks
Nordea
Swedbank
Handelsbanken
SEB
DNB
Danske Bank
Nordea
Swedbank
Handelsbanken
SEB
Danske Bank
Nordea
Currency NOK SEK EUR
Bonds in sample 8 5 8
The average yield curve for NIBOR and bonds in NOK with the same time to maturity is
plotted in the top left of figure 10. Similarly, STIBOR, EURIBOR and corresponding bond yields
are plotted in the top right corner and bottom left corner of figure 10. The average yield curve is
computed as the arithmetic mean of the yields in the sample.
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Figure 10. Comparing bond yields for swapped NIBOR/STIBOR and estimated bond yields.
The first notable feature visible from comparing bond yields in both NOK, SEK and EUR to
corresponding interest rate yield is that bond yields are consistently higher than the interest rate
yields. This systematic discrepancy which implies that the market price for corporate bonds are
higher than their offered rate clearly contradicts that the interbank rates represent the true domes-
tic lending rates in the interbank market. A plausible reason for this deviation for short maturities
is incorrect pricing of corporate bonds as maturity approaches. There is no available data for vol-
umes, but it is safe to assume that our root cause for this deviation is inconsistent pricing for short
maturities. When looking at the raw bond data there is often little or no change in the prices for
many bonds when there is fewer than 7 days to maturity. Due to inconsistent pricing patterns for
low maturities, the analysis does not cover shorter maturities than 1 week.
In the last plot, NIBOR, STIBOR and EURIBOR are compared against each other. From the
figures, it is straightforward to observe that the bond yields are higher than the interbank rates.
We observe that the bond yields for the various interbank markets are not the same, and we con-
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clude that the financing cost is not equal across domestic economies, which entails iC,C 6= iN,N
for N 6= C. The fact that domestic financing costs are unequal supports differences between the
interbank rates NIBOR, STIBOR and EURIBOR.
As the financing costs are unequal, we evaluate each interbank rate separately against its own
financing cost. The lack of consistent pricing as maturity approaches must be adjusted for be-
fore evaluating how the interbank and bond yields behave over maturity. The plot in the top left
corner of figure 11 illustrates the sample deviation between bond yields and interbank rates, and
the pricing patterns generate large deviation spikes for short maturities. When there is more than
one month left to maturity, the pricing becomes more persistent, and we observe that the sample
variations rapidly decrease after 1 month.
By adjusting the time frame of our sample for the liquidity issues in corporate bonds, we can
evaluate the data between maturities longer than 1 month. When excluding the two shortest
maturities (1 week and 1 month) it is possible to check how interbank and bond yields behave as
time to maturity increases. We reformulate our hypothesized relationship between the bond yields
and assume that over time, exchange-traded bonds will be priced correctly, and the bond yields
will represent the true yield required for lending money to the relevant bank. We test if
yt,BOND − yt,INTERBANK = β0 + β1t+ ε, (29)
Where we regress the difference between the yields on time to maturity, t. As time to maturity
increases, the financing cost proxied by the bond yields, and the interbank rates approximated
using the Nelson-Siegel model, should converge towards each other. We expect that if β0 is larger
than zero, β1 should be negative. Estimating an ordinary least squares regression on the difference
between the bond yields and the interbank yields on time gives us the best linear fit for the rela-
tionship between difference in yields and time.
The observed differences between bond and NIBOR yields are plotted in the two bottom and
top right graphs in figure 11 along with the individual fitted regression lines. The regression results
for NIBOR, STIBOR and EURIBOR over time are shown in table X.
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Table X Descriptive statistics for structure of the interbank rates
(NIBOR, robust) (STIBOR, robust) (EURIBOR, robust)
Time 2.0988∗ -2.0538∗ -3.9874∗∗∗
(0.94827) (0.82962) (0.84907)
Constant 36.158∗∗∗ 20.086∗∗∗ 55.107∗∗∗
(3.8084) (3.3319) (3.3633)
N 665 475 737
RMSE 31.3 23.2 29.1
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
As expected from the plotted interbank and bond yields, we have positive intercept (β0). The
interesting result is the difference in the magnitude for the time dependent coefficient (β1). Both
EURIBOR and STIBOR exhibit downward sloping time trends as we anticipated, which indicates
that the deviation between bond yields and interbank yields are decreasing. For NIBOR, however,
the coefficient is positive. This implies that the difference between the bond yields and NIBOR
quotes are increasing as time to maturity increases. Even though the deviation is decreasing for
EURIBOR and STIBOR, the magnitude of the coefficients are not large enough to impose that the
bond yields match the interbank yields within the maturity time frame. The results point towards
an inconsistency between the Norwegian interbank rate and the observed domestic funding cost.
They also point towards the same inconsistencies in the Swedish and European money market
for Norwegian banks. From analyzing the domestic financing cost against the interbank rates, we
conclude that we cannot impose that NIBOR is more inconsistent with the domestic lending cost
than other interbank rates.
The comparison of aggregate bond yields and interbank yields in the domestic economies gave
inconclusive results regarding the accuracy of the Norwegian interbank rate against domestic fi-
nancing cost. In order to further evaluate NIBOR, we must go back to our original definition of
NIBOR as a swap rate. The European bond market is a more popular bond market with respects
to number of bonds and liquidity. There will be a greater sample of bonds available for testing our
hypothesized relationship between interbank rates and bond yields. In order to compare the inter-
bank rates with a larger sample of bonds and under equal currency conditions, we swap NIBOR
and STIBOR to euros.
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Figure 11. Deviation and estimated difference between bonds and interbank rates
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C. Evaluating the interbank rates in foreign currency using the Nelson-Siegel model
We use the same technique to estimate factor loadings on swapped interest rates for NIBOR
and STIBOR. This makes it possible to compare the implied swapped yields from our Nelson-Siegel
model with a new sample of bonds to evaluate if the financing cost for Norwegian and Swedish banks
are the same as the financing cost for European banks contributing to EURIBOR. If we observe
that the financing cost for Norwegian banks in euros are higher than for European banks, we can
justify the observed difference between NIBOR, STIBOR and EURIBOR.
The formal relationship between NIBOR and foreign interbank rates are contingent on whether
the financing cost for Norwegian banks are equal to the financing cost for the European, iN,C = iC,C .
By swapping STIBOR and NIBOR to euros the interbank rates can be compared to a new sample
of 20 bonds. For comparison, we introduce a new independent sample for EURIBOR containing
corporate bonds for the large European banks contributing to EURIBOR, but not NIBOR or STI-
BOR. The European interbank yield is compared to 50 bonds from ING Bank, Deutsche Bank and
Barclays, whom are fairly similar to the Nordic banks and will serve as the domestic financing cost
in the eurozone, iC,C . The banks have been chosen based on geographic location, financial similari-
ties and default risk when using Standard Poor’s and Moody’s credit ratings as a risk benchmark.
All banks except Deutsche Bank have the highest short-term rating, P-1, by Moody’s (Deutsche
Bank has P-2), while S&P’s short-term rating varies from A-1 to A-1+ for Nordic banks, and from
A-2 to A-1 for European banks.
We first examine if the banks contributing to NIBOR and STIBOR face the same financing
conditions as the European banks contributing to EURIBOR, given by
iN,C = iC,C . (30)
These financing costs can be compared with the corresponding interbank rates, iC,C and iN,C . The
swapped interbank rates, yt,INTERBANK are approximated with the Nelson-Siegel model
yt,INTERBANK = yt(T ) = βˆ1t,S + βˆ2t,S
(
1− e−λˆtT
λˆtT
)
+ βˆ3t,S
(
1− e−λˆtT
λˆtT
− e−λˆtT
)
, (31)
where βˆ1t,S , βˆ2t,S and βˆ3t,S are estimated factors for swapped NIBOR and STIBOR to euros. The
bond yields yt,BONDS are calculated from observable bond prices in the euro bond market adjusted
for accrued interest rate, thereby
yt,BONDS =
(
100 + r(T − t)/360
Pt
) 360
T−t
− 1. (32)
During the evaluation of domestic financing costs in Norway, Sweden and Europe we concluded
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that these were unequal across currencies. We will start by examining if financing cost for the
NIBOR and STIBOR banks are equal to the independent European banks.
Figure 12 shows how the average financing cost up to 6 months maturity for NIBOR, STIBOR
and EURIBOR banks. The financing costs are fairly consistent, regardless of where the bank be-
longs. If we exclude the fluctuations during the first month, the difference between financing costs
from STIBOR to EURIBOR is 4.6 basis points, and 4.8 basis points between NIBOR and EURI-
BOR. The average financing cost for NIBOR is 161 basis points and 155 for EURIBOR banks for
1-6 months maturity, and an average difference of under 5 basis points is considered to be insignif-
icant. We conclude that banks contributing to NIBOR, STIBOR and EURIBOR face the same
financing costs in the European money market, and iN,C = iS,C = iC,C .
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Figure 12. Comparing financing cost.
When the banks face the same financing cost, iN,C = iC,C , the relationship between financing
cost in a foreign currency and the domestic offered rate is the swap rate
iN,N = iN,C + f − s = iC,C + f − s. (33)
In figure 13 both bond yields and interbank yields in euros have been plotted to compare the
financing cost in euros against the swapped offered rate. Comparing the swapped Norwegian and
Swedish interbank rate to the panel banks bond yields tells us a different story than what we ob-
served for local currency bonds. In the last graph in the bottom right corner, we have compared
the discrepancy between interbank rate and financing cost for NIBOR, STIBOR and EURIBOR.
EURIBOR is consistently below the observed financing cost, and converges to a deviation of around
-60 basis points. For STIBOR, the financing cost is surprisingly consistent with the banks’ financ-
ing cost, and the offered interbank rate is on average 6 basis points above the same bond yields.
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Swapped NIBOR is on average 53 basis points above the bond yields, even though the financing
cost for Norwegian banks is about the same as European banks.
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Figure 13. Comparing bond yields for swapped NIBOR/STIBOR and estimated bond yields.
The interbank rate and the aggregate bond yields have the same risk exposure, namely the
exposure towards any risk associated with the banks present in the interbank market. We observe
that there exists a premium in the Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate, which is not reflected in the
panel banks’ observed financing cost. This comparison of financing costs and offered rates implies
that even though Norwegian banks face the same financing costs abroad, there is an added premium
in the domestic interbank rate after adjusting for costs associated with neutralizing currency risk.
Before introducing the time dimension to the Nelson-Siegel model, we will apply the second
model for evaluating the interbank rates, the Vasicek model. Applying a secondary framework
based on different assumptions is a good way of evaluating if our results from the Nelson-Siegel
model are consistent with other aspects of interest rate theory.
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D. Evaluating the Nelson-Siegel model over time
The Nelson-Siegel model has only been evaluated in-sample with a separate estimation of the
parameters β1, β2 and β3 for each day. To evaluate if the dynamics of the estimated models are con-
sistent out-of-sample, and to increase our confidence in the findings, we perform an out-of-sample
forecast of the parameters. When introducing the time dimension to The Nelson-Siegel model,
characteristics concerning autocorrelation and stationarity of the time series must be identified.
We use the unit root test introduced by Dickey-Fuller to test for the presence of unit root in
our estimated factor and Treasury bill time series. The results for our Nelson-Siegel model are
shown in table XI, where several of our time series contain unit root. As the test fails to reject our
null hypothesis that unit root is present, they will be differentiated. After differentiating all the
time series are stationary with p-values less than 0.01. Based on the results from the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test we use the differentiated series in the autoregressive framework.
Table XI Results from Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for estimated factors
β1 β2 β3 Treasury Bill
H P-value H P-value H P-value H P-value
NIBOR 0 0.1191 1 0.0045 1 0.0109 0 0.0693
EURIBOR 0 0.1034 1 0.0291 0 0.0940 0 0.0808
STIBOR 0 0.1164 1 0.0022 1 0.0071 0 0.1300
Note: Sample is 20.10.2000-28.04.2015. ADF performed with 0-150 lags.
By structuring the three factors for each interest rate in a vector autoregressive framework
with exogenous factors (VARMAX), we are able to capture the interaction between the factors,
the lagged factors and other exogenous factors. We will use 3 month bond yield in NOK, SEK and
EUR to proxy a risk-free process, Xt. By incorporating the risk-free interest rate in the VARMAX
model, we can at the same time identify how changes in risk-free return over time affects the factors,
and thus the interbank rates.
To determine if an autoregressive model allows us to perform a more accurate out-of-sample
foreacast, we specify two different forecasting models. The first model is a tailored VARMAX
model, where each interbank rate is specified based on the autocorrelation function and partial
autocorrelation function. Our second model is an approach where the future factors cannot be
foreseen, and the variation is purely determined by stochastic shocks. The lack of a deterministic
component implies that the factors are random walk, and a differentiated random walk series is a
VARMAX(0) with no autoregressive components.
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To determine how many lags we must include in the tailored model to capture the time series
dynamics, we evaluate the factor’s autocorrelation function and partial autocorrelation function.
Plotted partial autocorrelation functions and autocorrelation functions for each time series is avail-
able in figure 46 to figure 51 in appendix E. The partial autocorrelation suggest autoregressive lags,
and NIBOR, STIBOR and EURIBOR are specified separately. No moving average components
are included as we suspect the small spikes in the autocorrelation plots will be addressed by the
autoregressive component. Our unrestricted vector autoregressive exogenous model (VARMAX)
for each interbank rate is
NIBOR : Yt = α+ βXt +
∑
i
AiYt−i + εt ∀ i = 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 18, 46, 75, 95, 109 (34)
STIBOR : Yt = α+ βXt +
∑
i
AiYt−i + εt ∀ i = 1, 2, 3, 8, 10, 11, 45, 59, 60, 80, 86, 89, 110
(35)
EURIBOR : Yt = α+ βXt +
∑
i
AiYt−i + εt ∀ i = 1, 6, 13, 20, 45, 60, 65, 70, 74, 80 (36)
Each Yt is a vector of the three factors, β1, β2 and β3 to ensure we capture indirect effects between
factors. Coefficients for the VARMAX models were estimated using least squares linear optimiza-
tion. The estimation results are summarized in table XII. When comparing MRSE and MAE for
the two proposed structures in table XII, there is some performance improvement for the tailored
model. Both models reject the null hypothesis in the Ljung-Box (1978) which indicates the residuals
are not white noise. Testing squared errors confirm that the variances for the models are condi-
tional. This indicates that a GARCH model with autoregressive variance would be appropriate to
adjust for time dependent variance, but due to the vast increase in complexity and the scope of the
paper, this will not be implemented.
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Table XII Model 1, Model 2 and Random Walk model
Model 1: Tailored Model 2: Random walk
NIBOR STIBOR EURIBOR NIBOR STIBOR EURIBOR
α1 0,0006 -0,0014 -0,0017 0 0 0
α2 -0,0019 0,0011 0,0013 0 0 0
α3 -0,0026 0,0009 0,0016 0 0 0
β1 0,5747 -1,3509 -0,0017 0 0 0
β2 -0,5636 1,6145 0,0087 0 0 0
β3 -0,7151 2,9581 0,0230 0 0 0
RMSE 1 0,1710 0,4077 0,1710 0,7683 0,4486 0,1767
RMSE 2 0,1547 0,3904 0,1547 0,7332 0,4280 0,1601
RMSE 3 0,2706 0,6306 0,2706 1,2263 0,6966 0,2811
MAE 1 0,0905 0,1968 0,0905 0,4167 0,1760 0,0924
MAE 2 0,0842 0,1901 0,0842 0,3955 0,1712 0,0864
MAE 3 0,1312 0,2994 0,1312 0,6622 0,2674 0,1353
LogLF 16590 9734 16590 2570 9058 15865
Note: Sample period is 20.10.2000-28.04.2015.
The most interesting elements from the VARMAX models is how the risk-free rate effects the
change in factors. From the β coefficients in table XII, we see that the model predicts an increase in
the risk-free rate does not effect EURIBOR, while STIBOR does not change in the short term level
(β1 + β2), but decreases the long term factor β1. For NIBOR, the short term level is unchanged,
but the long term factor β1 is increased. We will not draw any further conclusions based on the
magnitude of the coefficients as we have not corrected for conditional variance, but observing dif-
ferences between the interbank factors is still noteworthy.
We forecast out-of-sample for 125 observations using model 1 and the random walk model. A
summary of the results are presented in table XLII, XLIII and XLIV available in appendix E. The
last 180 observations along with the forecasted interval, and actual factors are plotted in figure 14,
15 and 16. The forecast is able to incorporate some of the variations out-of-sample - but there
are still large variations we are not able to capture. The forecasting accuracy for NIBOR is sig-
nificantly better than random walk, but STIBOR and EURIBOR perform similarly to random walk.
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Figure 14. NIBOR out-of-sample forecasted factor changes.
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Figure 15. STIBOR out-of-sample forecasted factor changes.
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Figure 16. EURIBOR out-of-sample forecasted factor changes.
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So what does this tell us about the dynamics of Nelson-Siegel model? Firstly, when we compare
the forecasted betas to the actual interest rate data, they fit well to the interbank rates we observe,
as shown when comparing forecasted interest rates against actual interest rates in appendix D.
This implies that the factors we forecast are quite consistent with the interest rate we observe out-
of-sample. The most important result from the out-of-sample forecast however, is that the model
does not forecast any extreme deviations from the actual factor loadings we observe. This would
indicate that the factors do not accurately represent the yield curve. Overall, the forecast provided
useful information about the forecasting ability of the Nelson-Siegel model and the accuracy of the
model on new observations.
E. Limitations of the Nelson-Siegel model
Even though the results indicated that the Nelson-Siegel model was able to fit the yield curves
for interbank rates well, there are several limitations and weaknesses to the analysis.
For time period with few maturities, over-fitting is a clear weakness when estimating three
parameters. It is challenging to quantify how serious over-fitting is for the time periods, but we
do observe some high variations in the estimated factors, which are likely to be caused by small
daily sample sizes. Fixing the decay parameter was one measures taken to reduce extensiveness of
over-fitting. The issue is briefly discussed when introducing the model, and another possibility to
address the over-fitting is to include other sources of data. As other sources will not have the same
risk dynamics, this approach was discarded. Despite the advantages of fixing the decay parameter,
this limits the Nelson-Siegel models ability to capture yield curve dynamics. The model was tested
using a variety of decay parameters to evaluate how changes in the decay parameter changed the
estimation results, but the changes were not systematically identified to get a complete picture of
how a misspecified decay parameter would effect the overall results.
The bond sample used in the estimation of the Nelson-Siegel model was unsecured senior bonds,
which may have biased the sample. As the distribution of bonds is not evenly spread across the
panel banks, it is clear that there are variations in the number of bonds with stated guarantee type
between panel banks. Bloomberg and Reuters might favor to check and verify guarantee type for
panel banks conditional on how large the demand from their users is for a particular bank or type
of bond. We were able to include both fixed and zero coupon bonds, but could not use the vast
sample of bonds with other structures such as variable coupon and index-linked prices. These bond
structures could be favored by some panel banks or the financial party issuing bonds on behalf of
the banks, and thus make the bank underrepresented in our sample.
When evaluating if the financing costs were equal across currencies, the underlying bond dis-
tribution across years is different for the Norwegian and European banks. As the bond yields vary
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across time, this could make the average bond yields not have the same time-varying effects, which
would effect our results. We were able to ensure that all panel banks were represented with corpo-
rate bonds in the paper, but not all banks are represented in every estimation of financing costs.
There are many limitations and complications in the estimation of the VARMAX model such
as conditional variance, not sufficiently incorporating moving average dynamics and cross-checking
our estimated model against similar models with different autoregressive components. As our re-
sults were not especially dependent upon the result from the VARMAX mode, these weaknesses
have not influenced our results significantly.
F. The Vasicek model
In our second model, we assume the short-rate follows a stochastic process. Recall the stochas-
tic expansion of the short-rate over time in equation (16). To determine the structure of the yield
curve each day we must estimate the parameters θ, k and σ. There are two different approaches
to applying a short-rate model: calibration and estimation.
Calibration of a short-rate model implies that the parameters θ, k and σ are calibrated ac-
cording to available market data in an information set Ft. In our case, this implies estimating the
expansion of the short-rate given the available interbank rates for different maturities at each point
of time similarly to the Nelson-Siegel model. The underlying assumption for the calibration process
is that the future short-rate from time t = 0 will follow the stochastic process in the Vasicek model.
Estimation of the short-rate model involves modeling the best parameters for historical data across
time for the individual maturities. The underlying assumption for the estimation technique is that
each interest rate itself follows the stochastic process, and each interest rate has its own long term
trend, mean reversion and volatility.
As the Nelson-Siegel model is approximated to fit the yield curve, we wish to gain additional
insights in the accuracy of the dynamics in the interest rate by using the estimation approach. We
have established that the financing cost in foreign currency is inconsistent with the interbank rate
for past bond prices, but so far we have not incorporated any information for bonds in today’s
money market. By using this estimation approach, we can derive the interest rate dynamics to
evaluate current bond prices, and we can cross check if our results for bonds maturing in the
future are consistent with the evaluation of bonds whom matured in the past. To estimate our the
parameters in the Vasicek framework, we model the innovation process over time as the Vasicek
differential equation
dr(t) = k(θ − r(t))dt+ σdW (t), (37)
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and the equation will be estimated as
yt = β1 + β2xt + εt (38)
yt is equal to the change in interest rate, dr(t), β1 is the time invariant component, kθ, and β2 is
the daily effect of the decay parameter, −kd(t). The interest rate volatility is calculated based on
the residuals from the regression, σ =
√
V ar(εt)
dt . Our time increments are 1 day, we thereby convert
NIBOR, STIBOR and EURIBOR yields to daily effective yields.
A summary of estimation results for selected maturities is presented in table XIII. The Vasicek
model allows for negative interest rates, but after estimating the parameters, we observe that the
results for STIBOR and EURIBOR become skewed. As the interest rates for STIBOR pass the
zero threshold, the mean reversion parameter, k, becomes negative. For EURIBOR, the ordinary
least squares application makes the mean reversion parameter k very small, and our long term
trend θ becomes unproportionally scaled as θˆ = βˆ1
kˆ
. There are also problems with stationarity of
the process when the decay parameter is negative. NIBOR has never been below zero, and thus
we can still use the results from the Vasicek estimation to evaluate if the estimated parameters are
consistent with market data we observe.
Table XIII Summary of estimated Vasicek paramters
Maturity k θ σ
Nibor 1 Month 0,00099 1,92487 0,00019
3 Month 0,00067 1,23102 0,00013
EURIBOR 1 Month 0,00027 -2,66492 0,00006
3 Month 0,00022 -3,72377 0,00004
STIBOR 1 Month -0,00011 13,03425 0,00008
3 Month -0,00014 11,06119 0,00008
To evaluate if our estimated dynamics of NIBOR are consistent with the market’s interpretation
of dynamics of interest rates for unsecured loans, we apply the Vasicek model to calculate an explicit
price for any given day. To see if current prices for bonds maturing in the future are consistent
with the estimated prices, we use zero coupon bonds maturing after our sample period. As there is
a limited sample of unsecured zero coupon bonds in Norway, and the results from the Nelson-Siegel
model were inconclusive for the domestic market, we will utilise Vasicek on Norwegian banks in
foreign currency to either confirm or contradict the results so far.
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G. Evaluating the interbank rates in foreign currency using Vasicek
As the bonds are issued in euros, we must estimate new Vasicek parameters for the swapped
NIBOR interbank rates. The adjusted parameters are presented in table XIV. There are minor
differences in the estimated parameters k and σ, but the estimated long term interest rate, θ drops
significantly between 1 month and 2 month maturity. As the difference between 1 month and 2
month NIBOR does not change this radically, it is caused by a change in the forward rates.
Table XIV Summary of estimated Vasicek paramters for NIBOR
k θ σ RMSE MAE
1 Week 0,385965 1,850461 0,000762 0,150453 0,015893
1 Month 0,344612 1,628436 0,000682 0,126783 0,014226
2 Month 0,239203 0,87487 0,000493 0,104275 0,010274
3 Month 0,2297 0,733602 0,000445 0,10169 0,009271
6 Month 0,251888 0,793196 0,000457 0,106383 0,009525
To evaluate if these dynamics are consistent with the dynamics we observe in the bond market,
we price bonds using the estimated dynamics, and compare to actual bond prices. The Vasicek
model lets us explicitly calculate the bond price based on our assumptions about the future short-
rate by first expressing the bond yield as
y(T ) =
1− e−kˆT
kt
r0 +
(
1− 1− e
−kˆT
kt
)
θˆ − 1
2
(
σˆ
kˆ
)2(
1− 21− e
−kˆT
kˆT
+
1− e−2kˆT
2kˆT
)
, (39)
where we use the estimated kˆ, θˆ and σˆ for each maturity. The Vasicek model has some similarities
to the Nelson-Siegel model, but are fundamentally different, which makes it suitable for comparing
results. Using the estimated yield, we can derive a continuous price path during the sample given
by
P (t, T ) = P (T, T )ey(T−t). (40)
Where P (T, T ) is the payment received at time T when the bond matures. For simplicity and
to make the results consistent with price data in the market, we use zero coupon bonds where
P (T, T ) = 100. Inserting our explicit solution for the yield lets us express the price at time t as
P (t, T ) = A(t, T )e−B(t,T )r(t), (41)
Where the price at time t, P (t, T ), is a function of A(t, T ) and B(t, T ) expressed by the estimated
parameters from the Vasicek model
A(t, T ) = exp[
(
θˆ − σˆ
2
2kˆ2
)
(B(t, T )− T + t)− σˆ
2
4k
B(t, T )2], (42)
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B(t, T ) =
1
kˆ
(
1− e−kˆ(T−t)
)
. (43)
We hypothesize that if the dynamics are consistent with the dynamics in the bond market, the
actual bond prices should lie within the span of the dynamics we have estimated. The estimated
price path, Pˆ (t, T ) will be compared to actual bond prices, and if the interest rate dynamics we
derived using the Vasicek model is the underlying interest rate dynamics for the bonds, and thus
the financing cost, they should be the same.
there were 13 unsecured bonds available in the European money market, and the complete list
of relevant bond information is available in table XXXIV in appendix A.A. In figure 17, 18 and
19 we have plotted the bond prices against the 5 estimated prices paths for each set of interest
rate dynamics. The figures compare the estimated price patterns given by the Vasicek dynamics to
the actual bond prices observed during our 125 day period. The figures highlights two important
aspects; the first is how consistently priced our bonds are. As many of the bonds mature close to
each other, we expect that prices look similar during the period. The consistency in prices implies
there is little market friction present to affect the bond prices. The second, and most important
observation, is that bond prices are consistently higher than the estimated prices using the inter-
bank rate dynamics. Only one out of 13 bonds lie within the price span given by the interbank
dynamics for a majority of the time period. As the bond prices are higher than the estimated
prices, they have a lower yield, which indicates there is an added premium on the interbank rates,
which is not reflected in the financing cost. Higher interbank yields than bond yields is consistent
with our previous result when we compared the financing cost against the interbank rates in euros
using the Nelson-Siegel model.
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Figure 17. Comparing estimated price with actual bond price.
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Figure 18. Comparing estimated price with actual bond price.
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Figure 19. Comparing estimated price with actual bond price.
H. Limitations to the Vasicek model
As the Vasicek model assumes a deterministic long term trend θ, decay parameter k and the
short rate volatility σ, there are limitations to the flexibility of the model. We are unable to in-
corporate fundamental changes to the interest rate market, and the future estimated values are
influenced by all the historic data we utilise during the estimation. It can be argued that a sample
of 15 years is not representative for the current interest rate landscape, or that a more dynamic
model which allows for time varying factors is a better fit.
Utilising the calibration method for the Vaicek model is arguably more directly comparable to
the Nelson-Siegel approach, and might provide more useful information than the estimation tech-
nique. This approach would, however, suffer from over-fitting similarly to the Nelson-Siegel model
as there are more parameters to estimate for each day in the Vasicek model.
The bond sample used in the estimation of the Vasicek model was unsecured senior bonds, like
in the Nelson-Siegel model, and thereby face the same weaknesses. In addition to this, a potential
sample bias is the use of only zero coupon bonds. Some banks may favor issuing zero coupon bonds
opposed to using other coupon structures.
I. Partial conclusion
The aim of this section was to determine if NIBOR represents the true lending cost in the
Norwegian interbank market. We have applied two different theoretical frameworks in order to
provide insights to the accuracy of the offered interbank rates compared to the observed lending
costs in the market.
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We have compared the yield curves for interbank rates with corresponding financing cost in
both domestic and foreign currency. The interbank rates were transformed to a continuous yield
curve using the Nelson-Siegel model while the financing costs were estimated using senior unsecured
corporate bonds. Comparing domestic financing cost against domestic interbank rates showed in-
consistencies between the lending cost in the Norwegian money market compared to NIBOR. The
results are however inconclusive as we found similar results in the Swedish and European money
market for Norwegian banks. In all three cases, we observed higher financing costs than the offered
interbank rate for corresponding maturities, and observed that financing costs in the domestic cur-
rencies are not equal. Differences in financing cost across currencies can justify differences between
interbank rates.
To further evaluate the foreign lending cost for Norwegian banks, we used the European money
market by swapping NIBOR and STIBOR to euros. We introduced a new sample of banks in
Europe with similar characteristics to determine if the financing cost for Norwegian and European
banks in the European monkey market is consistent. The results from the Nelson-Siegel model
showed that the Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate has been higher than both the Swedish and the
European interbank rate, after adjusting for currency risk, even though banks face equal financing
cost. This discrepancy was again evaluated using the the Vasicek model for each individual interest
rate by estimating interest rate dynamics for each swapped NIBOR maturity. The Vasicek model
was used to compute a price range for corporate bonds consistent with the interest rate dynamics
observed in the interbank market. Using a new sample of senior unsecured corporate bonds, we
compared the estimated prices with actual price data. Comparison showed that bond prices were
consistently higher than prices estimated by the model. These results are in line with results from
the Nelson-Siegel model, which indicated that there exists a discrepancy between the offered inter-
bank rate in Norway and the financing cost in foreign currency.
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VI. Chapter 2: The microstructure of NIBOR
In the previous chapter we examined the dynamics of the NIBOR fixing with respect to matu-
rities and time in a cross-country perspective by evaluating NIBOR in both domestic and foreign
currency. In the following chapter we extend the analysis by taking a closer look at the microstruc-
ture of NIBOR. We define the microstructure of NIBOR as the underlying quotes reported by the
individual banks of the NIBOR panel.
This section analyses the quotes that constitute the rate along two dimensions: the first dimen-
sion will be looking the long term dynamics of the quotes for the 12:00 pm daily fixing relative to
underlying credit risk proxied by credit default swap spreads. The second dimension will utilise the
high frequency indicative deposit rates (IDR) to examine and identify short term patterns in the
quotes. Note that the IDRs are not covered by the NIBOR rules, and are not regarded as actual
NIBOR fixings. However, the quoted IDR from each bank is used for the NIBOR fixing at 12:00
pm, and it will serve as a good indicator of how the individual reported quotes, and thereby how
NIBOR fluctuate within a given day. By examining the microstructure along these two dimen-
sions, we seek to answer the fundamental research question of how the structure and governance
of NIBOR affect the participants’ contribution to the interest rate. Our concluding remarks from
chapter 1 indicated that even though Norwegian banks face equal financing conditions as European
banks, NIBOR is quoted significantly higher. In the extension of this, we seek to give further insight
on whether there exist any systematic similarities or differences in the rate reporting across panel
banks.
A. Choice of framework
The approach and theoretical frameworks will be different for the two dimensions of interest.
Part one decomposes the NIBOR rate based on the six underlying quotes that constitute the 12:00
pm fixing. This entails having both a cross-sectional dimension and a time-series dimension, which
allows us to study bank characteristics across time. Utilising these inherent properties, we will
construct a model allowing for unobserved individual effects across banks and time. The model
utilises credit default swap spreads on corporate senior bonds as a proxy for bank credit risk. It
examines long term dynamics by comparing the quoted interest rates to underlying credit risk.
The second part explores the short term patterns of the high frequency IDRs. High-frequency
data have the inherent property of arriving at irregularly spaced intervals, which significantly limits
the number of suitable econometric models which often requires fixed interval data. The availabil-
ity of high-frequency data has increased simultaneously with increasing computational power the
last decades. This has resulted in a new research area, which has grown substantially. What is
considered the start of this fast growing area of research was first presented by Robert F. Engle in
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1996 and published in 2000. This pioneering work has later resulted in several econometric models
applicable for irregularly spaced financial time series, in which many of them are developments
of models that originally was intended for regular time series. Many of these frameworks seek
to capture the non-linearities, intraday seasonalities, and dynamics of the duration between each
observation (Hautsch, 2012). However, being interested in examining short term patterns of the
IDRs we have chosen to apply a hidden markov model. The application of hidden markov models
is more uncommon within economics, but is widely used in computer science on sequential data,
and especially within speech recognition (Rabiner, 1989). In this paper, the model will be used in
a similar fashion to recognize and hence capture patterns of the IDRs.
B. Unobserved individual effects
In order to address the unobserved individual effects, let us postulate a standard multiple
regression model with K explanatory variables. Denote each individual bank with i, the time
period t, and extend the model by allowing for unobserved effects ai. This coefficient represents
the unobserved effects within the sample, which in our case is between the individual panel banks.
yit =
K∑
k=0
xitkβk + ai + uit, t = 1, 2, ..., T. (44)
Note that we define xit0 = 1 and that uit is idiosyncratic error as it changes across both dimensions,
t and i. Unless we are able to isolate and incorporate the unobserved effects in the model, ai is a
part of the error term. When not addressing the presence of unobserved effects in our regression
model, the standard regression model is
yit =
K∑
k=0
xitkβk + vit, vit = ai + uit ∧ t = 1, 2, ..., T. (45)
Although disagreed on by some econometricians, modern econometric parlance often refer to the
unobserved effect as either fixed or random effects(Wooldridge, 2010). Having unobserved ran-
dom effects is identical to stating that there is zero correlation between the explanatory vari-
ables and the unobserved effect, Cov(xitk, ai) = 0, t = 1, 2, ..., T . A fixed effects model on the
other hand allows for correlation between the unobserved effect and the explanatory variables,
cov(xitk, ai) 6= 0, t = 1, 2, ..., T . Knowing the proper definitions, we may now draw up models that
take the preceding statements into account, and explore the limitations and advantages of utilising
one approach over the other. Lastly, we present a selection criterion comparing the estimation
results from fixed and random effects to help us decide the most appropriate model according to
the data we have. Note that for both models to yield unbiased, and hence consistent results, we
need strict exogeneity in the explanatory variables, i.e E(uit|xitk, ai) = 0 (Wooldridge, 2012).
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For the fixed effect model, there are several approaches. The most common ones are the least
square dummy variable approach (LSDV), the within group estimator (WG) and the first difference
approach (FD). While the LSDV and WG yield equal results for all numbers of time periods, the
FD approach is only equal to the other two approaches when T = 2. Let us start of by presenting
the models, and thereafter select the fitting model for our desired purpose.
The LSDV approach remove individual specific effects from the error term by including dummy
variables. Generally, a multiple regression model with dummies to correct for effects is expressed
as
yit =
K∑
k=0
xitkβk +
N−1∑
i=1
aiδi + uit, t = 1, 2, ..., T. (46)
Where δi is a dummy variable indicating each individual. We include N − 1 dummies, as having N
dummies would imply perfect multicollinearity. A very important detail worth noting is the fact
that we have kept the individual effects ai in the equation.
The WG estimator relies on a transformation to correct for fixed effects. Define the following
variables:
y∗it = yit − y¯i,
x∗it = xit − x¯i,
u∗it = uit − u¯i.
Let us expand y∗it using a multiple regression model as in equation (44) for a given time in a one
explanatory variable case for simplification. This entails
y∗it = (β0 + β1xit1 + ai + uit)− (β0 + β1x¯i + ai + u¯i). (47)
By simplifying terms, we are left with our WG model. Note that the model in order to address the
unobserved effects have removed ai from the equation:
y∗it = β1x
∗
it + u
∗
it. (48)
Lastly, the FD approach transforms the equation by taking the first difference of the multiple
regression model in equation (44). Similarly to the WG model, ai disappears as it does not fluctuate
across time, and
∆yit =
K∑
k=0
∆xitkβk + ∆uit, t = 1, 2, ..., T. (49)
The three approaches all correct the multiple regression for fixed effects, but in different ways.
Both the WG and the FD approach address unobserved effects by removing the time invariant ef-
fect from the equation. This correction prohibits us to make any inference about variation between
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the groups, which is the variation between panel banks we want to examine. The LSDV approach
is the only approach to address unobserved effects and still keep it in the modelled equation. We
will thereby only use the LSDV approach of the fixed effect models.
As we briefly addressed in the introductory discussion, we distinguish between fixed and random
effects. Deriving the random effects model is quite similar to the WG estimation, however it is a
bit more tedious (Wooldridge, 2010). Let us again start out at the multiple regression in equation
(44) and impose some assumptions regarding the error term and the individual effects (Wooldridge,
2012).
yit =
K∑
k=0
xitkβ + vit, t = 1, 2, ..., T (50)
where
vit = ai + uit, (51)
ai ∼ N(0, σ2a), (52)
uit ∼ N(0, σ2u). (53)
Under these assumptions, we must have serially correlated vit across time:
corr(vit, vis) =
σ2a
(σ2a + σ
2
u)
, t 6= s. (54)
We now have to use generalized least squares (GLS) to solve the serial correlation problem. The
GLS transformation itself is quite simple, although deriving it is time and space consuming. Let
us thereby define the following GLS transformation:
λ = 1− [ σ
2
a
σ2a + Tσ
2
u)
]
1
2 , 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, (55)
yit − λy¯i =
K∑
k=0
(xitk − λx¯ik)βk + (vit − λv¯i). (56)
The random effects model hence subtracts a fraction, λ, of the average dependent on the variance
of the error terms σ2a, σ
2
u. Observe now that the random effects transformation in accordance with
the LSDV method allow for time invariant unobserved effects. On a further note the random effects
model is equal to the within group model when λ = 1. This entails that the random effects model
must be more efficient as it consumes less degrees of freedom, contingent on the models producing
the same results.
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C. Hausman test
Next we have to determine whether to apply the LSDV approach or the random effects model.
Hausman proposed a specification test that is applicable for our particular problem (1978). The
basic idea of the Hausman test is to check whether the random effect and fixed effect estimates lie
close enough such that it does not matter which one we use. We would preferably use the random
effects model, as it is more efficient, and as such, it tests whether we have enough evidence to reject
the random effects model.
Let us first define the following variables, where VC is the variance-covariance matrix, and the
βs are the regression coefficients of the model.
V C(qˆ1) = V C(βˆ
FE)− V C(βˆRE), (57)
qˆ1 = βˆ
FE − βˆRE . (58)
Utilising these variables, the Hausman test is specified as
m = qˆ1
′[V C(qˆ1]−1qˆ1, (59)
where m is assumed to follow a chi-square distribution ∼ χdf=p, and p is the number of endogenous
variables. The null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis being
H0 : βˆ
FE ∼= βˆRE , (60)
HA : βˆ
FE 6= βˆRE , (61)
which entails that if we reject the null hypothesis, the fixed effects model would be preferred.
The Hausman test serves an arguably more important role than determining if we can use the more
efficient random effects model: it allows us to test if there are fixed effects present in the data.
The introduction of the Hausman test concludes the frameworks used to quantify the relation
between the interest rate and underlying credit risk. In the following section, we will introduce
the hidden markov model that will be applied to examine the short term patterns of the indicative
deposit rates.
D. Hidden markov model
For analysing the time-varying high frequency data, we can evaluate a sequence of observed
data as the result of an underlying Hidden Markov process. Hidden markov models (hereby HMM)
are often referred to as probabilistic functions of Markov chains, and the earliest work on theory of
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probabilistic functions of Markov chains originates from work published by Leonard E. Baum and
his colleagues at the Institute for Defense Analyses(1966; 1967; 1970; 1972). A Markov chain has
the following property:
Definition: Let X = X1, X2, ... be a random process in discrete state space R. It is called a
Markov chain if the conditional probabilities between the outcomes at different times satisfy the
Markov property for every sequence x1, x2, .., xt+1 ∈ R:
P (Xt+1 = xt+1|Xt = xt, Xt−1 = xt−1, ..., X1 = x1) = P (Xt+1 = xt+1|Xt = xt),
and the probability of what we observe is only conditional on the previous observation. The theory
underlying HMMs has been known for decades, however, due to it only being published in math-
ematical journals, its availability and application was for a long time somewhat unknown to other
disciplines. With an increasing amount of tutorials on implementation and theory throughout the
1980s, popularity began to rise, especially within the field of speech recognizing. There are numer-
ous different versions of the HMM, adapted to different situations. For this particular case, we limit
ourselves to look at the discrete case original HMM, as this approach is suitable for our problem
at hand. The application in this paper has been programmed in MATLAB R© based on theory from
the article published by Lawrence R. Rabiner(1989)
Hamilton (1987) popularized application of Markov chains on autoregressive time series. This
development spans the foundation for application on financial time series. Recent work with HMMs
on financial data seek to forecast values, like for instance Hassan and Nath (2005) which forecast
stock prices of airline companies. Other applications use HMMs to capture dynamics of the volatil-
ity of financial time series. Zhuang and Chan (2008) use it to capture structural volatility changes
that regular GARCH models do not capture.
The complete derivation of the HMM is quite tedious and somewhat complex. We will thereby
only present the intuition behind each step in the following section. The interested reader may
refer to appendix G for the complete mathematical derivation of the procedures utilised during
the implementation. To get a firm grip on the intuition of the HMM, we will first introduce its
elements, their properties and relationship. Thereafter we will look at some of the implementation
issues, which arise, and how they can be solved.
E. Elements of the hidden markov model
The HMM contains five different elements, which span the basis of the model:
1. N, the number of states in the model. These states follow a Markov process and are by
definition hidden, we do hence not know which state the observation has been extracted
from. Denote the states by S = S1, S2, ..., SN , and the state at time t as qt.
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2. M, the number of distinct observation symbols per state. We denote the individual symbols
as V = v1, v2, ..., vk.
3. The state transition probability distribution A = aij , where aij is the probability to transition
from state Si at time t, to state Sj at time t+1:
aij = P [qt+1] = Sj |qt = Si], 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N
4. The observation symbol probability distribution in state j, B = {bj(k)}, where bj(k) is the
probability of observing vk at time t given state Sj :
bj(k) = P [vk at t|qt = Sj ], 1 ≤ j ≤ N, 1 ≤ k ≤M
5. The initial state distribution pi = {pii} where pii is the probability of starting in state Si:
pii = P [q1 = Si], 1 ≤ i ≤ N
To apply the HMM, we must specify N, M, the number of observation, a discrete distribution
for the observations, and the probability matrices A, B and pi. We will similarly to the article by
Rabiner (1989) use the following notation for the HMM:
λ = (A,B, pi),
where λ is a collective notation for the chosen A, B and pi.
F. Implementing and optimising the hidden markov model
Given the preceding framework, three problems must be addressed in order to efficiently imple-
ment the model:
1. Given the observation sequence O = O1O2 · · ·OT , and a model λ = (A,B, pi), how do we in
an efficient manner compute P (O|λ) - the probability of the observation sequence, given the
model?
2. Given the observation sequence O = O1O2 · · · OT , and a model λ = (A,B, pi), how do we
choose a corresponding state sequence Q = q1q2 · · · qT which best explains the observations?
3. How do we adjust the model parameters of λ = (A,B, pi) in order to maximize P (O|λ)?
1. The intuitive approach to calculating P (O|λ) would be to enumerate through every possible
state sequence of length ”T”. The probability of the observations sequence given the model is
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obtained by summing over the joint probability over all possible state sequences:
P (O|λ) =
∑
Q
P (O|Q,λ)P (Q,λ) =
∑
q1,q2,···,qT
piq1bq1(O1)aq1q2bq2(O2) · · · aqT−1qT bqt(OT )
Using the brute force method would entail a total of 2T ·NT calculations, as there are N possible
states that could be reached at any given time. Which would be unfeasible for N=6 states even
with quite few time steps. It would for instance imply 2·50·650 ≈ 8·1040 given T=50 - an unfeasible
amount of computations. The solution to the preceding problem is a forward-backward procedure.
The forward-backward procedure consists, as the name suggests of two different variables, the for-
ward and the backward variable. Technically, we only need the forward variable for this particular
problem, but we will introduce the concept of the backward variable as it is used to solve the other
two implementation issues.
The forward variable αt(i) is the probability of observing a given observation sequence until
time t, and state Si at time t. The probability of observing the observation sequence given the
model must hence be the sum of αt(i) across all states at time t. Using this method instead of
the brute force procedure reduces the number of calculations to N2T . This entails that we have
reduced the number of calculations from 8 · 1040 to 62 · 50 = 1800 for our preceding example. The
backward variable βt(i) is on the other hand the probability of the observation sequence from t+ 1
to time T , given state Si at time t. They will both be utilised to solve our next two problems.
2. The second problem may be solved in several different manners, whereas the most dynamic
one would be to apply a Viterbi algorithm, which takes into account limitations concerning possible
states to transcend to. However, since we might reach any state sj from state si, the problem
may be solved straightforward utilising the forward and backward variables. In order to find the
the optimal state sequence, we define a new variable γt(i), which is a product of our forward and
backward variable, as the probability of being in state Si at time t. The most likely state would
hence be uncovered by using gamma to find the most likely state at for all t.
3. As for problem 3, there is no known way to analytically solve for the model that maximises the
probability of the observation sequence. We are however able to choose λ = (A,B, pi) such that the
probability of the observation sequence given the model is locally maximized by using an algorithm
such as the Baum-Welch(1970). Applying the Baum-Welch algorithm is known as training the
model as it iteratively improves the likelihood of P (O|λ) with each iteration.
The algorithm uses our forward and backward variables to generate a new variable ξt(i, j), which
is the probability of being in state Si at time t, and state Sj at time t+1. It then re-estimates
our initial parameters A, B and pi by using both γt(i) and ξt(i, j). These re-estimation equations
originate from the intuition brought to the table by Baum and his colleagues(1970). Define the
70
new model as λ¯ = (A¯, B¯, p¯i). They then proved that if you maximize a given likelihood function,
using λ¯ = (A¯, B¯, p¯i) leads to an increase in the likelihood of the model. Utilising their result, we can
replace λ with λ¯ and repeat the re-estimation procedure. This re-estimation is then repeated until
we reach the nearest local maximum of the likelihood function. Note that this iterative technique
will only converge towards the nearest local maximum of the likelihood function, which hence gives
us no guarantee of having the global maximum of the likelihood function.
Because the iterative technique only converges locally, the initial values of the model will have
an impact on our solution considering that the optimization surface is complex and has multiple
maximum. Rabiner(1989) points to the fact that there are no straightforward answer to selecting
initial state. He further states that for A and pi, experience shows that either random or uniform
initial estimates are adequate. For B on the other hand, good initial estimates are helpful in the
discrete case, and more essential for the continuous case. He further points out that initial esti-
mates can be obtained in a number of ways, such as manual segmentation of sequences into states
with averaging of observations within state, maximum likelihood segmentation of observations with
averaging and segmental k-means segmentation with clustering.
As we wanted to examine short term patterns of the Indicative Deposit Rates, training the hid-
den markov model on the entire sequence of observations would yield no insight with regards to the
question at hand. Hence we would have to modify our training of the model such that it maximizes
P (O|λ) for each defined interval. Addressing the problem in such a manner, we can start out by
dividing our entire data sample into k sequences of data. Assuming that the observation sequences
are independent of each other, we would now seek to maximize the product of the probability of
observing each sequence, given the model. We are then able to utilise the individual model for each
observation sequence to create the model that is on average the most likely for a given day across
the entire set of observations.
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VII. Chapter 2: Evaluating the microstructure of NIBOR
So far, our results have indicated there seems to be some discrepancies between NIBOR and the
lending cost of panel banks relative to other countries. In the following section, we seek to uncover
characteristics of the microstructure of NIBOR that might be cause for the observed discrepancy
across countries. We will evaluate the discrepancy along our two dimensions; long term dynamics
and short term patterns. The first part investigates whether the individual NIBOR quotes reflects
the panel banks individual underlying credit risk. Although NIBOR is quoted as an offered rate
to an unspecified counterparty in the interbank market, it should still reflect the individual banks’
credit risk. The second part examines the short term development of the interest rate, and seeks
to uncover whether panel banks have the same perception of the short term development of the
interest rate.
A. The relationship between NIBOR quotes and underlying credit risk
Recall that we wanted to examine how the structure and governance of NIBOR affected the
participants’ contribution to the interest rate. From a theoretical point of view, the credit default
swap (CDS) is a financial derivative for a specific instrument (bond), which are to cover unspecified
debt from a specific counterparty (bank). The swaps prices are quoted as the spread between the
return on a senior corporate bond and the risk-free rate, and should hence be a good reflection of
the credit risk within a certain bank. As the CDS spread reflects the credit risk across the panel
banks, our data serves as a proxy of the credit risk present in the Norwegian interbank market
for each individual bank. In Chapter 1, we derived the relationship between the interbank rates,
financing cost, the risk-free interest rate and default premium. The financing cost in a domestic
economy is given by
iN,N = rfN + rpN , (62)
and the financing cost is again lower than the offered interest rate, iN,N ≤ iN,N . Having proxied the
credit risk in the interbank market, a reasonable assumption to impose on the result would be that
increased credit risk within the Norwegian interbank market should have an effect on both higher
borrowing costs in both foreign and domestic currency, and thus increasing the cost of domestic
lending. Theory would hence predict that increased credit risk would increase NIBOR. Recognizing
the connection between the credit default swap spreads and credit risk is the foundation for our
upcoming model.
Before applying our framework for identifying individual characteristics across banks and time,
we must transform our data to ensure unbiased results. As the lowest available credit default swap
maturity is one year, there is no interbank rate which coincide perfectly with the maturity of the
credit default swaps. Though this is not optimal, and provides some unpredictability in the results,
we will utilise the 6 month NIBOR rate in order to get the time horizons as coinciding as possible.
72
To isolate and compare the default premium for the banks to the individual quotes, we subtract the
domestic risk-free rate from the NIBOR quotes. We proxy the risk-free rate by using Norwegian
government 6 month Treasury bill, and consider the difference between NIBOR and the risk-free
rate as the NIBOR domestic premium. Finally, we swap the CDS spreads from USD to NOK
to eliminate currency risk, and convert from basis points to percentages to conveniently have the
same unity across the variables. Observe furthermore that our panel has relatively few individuals
compared to the length of the time frame. This entails that we have to address the issue of having
stationary series to avoid problems with spurious regression, i.e providing relations that does not
really exist. We used the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test to check for stationarity in the panel data,
and conclude that all our time series are stationary with non-zero mean. The number of lags were
determined using the Akaike Information Criterion. The critical values from our tests may be found
in table XLV appendix F.
In figure 20 the average NIBOR domestic premium along with the CDS spreads has been plotted
for the time period October 2012 to November 2015. The relationship within each individual bank
is available in figure 52 appendix F. There seem to be some mutual tendencies between the series,
it is however quite difficult to tell whether there exist a relationship between the CDS spread and
the domestic premium by just looking at the graph.
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Figure 20. Average of 6M NIBOR domestic premium and 1 year maturity CDS spread
We might increase our understanding further by looking at the relationship between the vari-
ables within each bank across time. Figure 21 plots the domestic premium divided by the CDS
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spread within each bank for the entire sample. The notches indicate whether we may reject on
a 95% significance level that the medians are different. The edge of the boxes indicate the 25%
and 75% percentiles, while the end of the stapled lines roughly corresponds to the 99% percentile.
Everything marked by red crosses are thereby defined as outliers. Observe by figure 21 that the
median rate to spread ratio varies to some extent across banks. There is furthermore an extensive
spread across banks in the volatility of the ratio. Although we recognize the fact that there should
not be a one-to-one relationship between the spreads and the interest rate for reasons such as not
coinciding maturities, there should be some consistency between the two. This consistency seems
to vary both across and within banks.
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Figure 21. Rate premium divided by CDS spread across banks
Let us now postulate a model that quantifies the relationship between the market price for
underlying credit risk within the panel banks and their corresponding NIBOR premium relative
to the 6-month Norwegian government Treasury bill. We used the premium as our dependent
variable and the CDS spread as our independent variable. Observing differences across banks, we
also control for unobserved effects utilising both a random effects and a fixed effects model. This
postulated model did however not indicate any significant relationship between the CDS spread.
By looking at the dynamics of figure 20, we then tried to account for time fixed effects through
including both year and monthly dummies, which gave quite different results. The Hausman test
suggests that the individual unobserved effects are fixed for our first model, and random for our
second and third. The models are presented in table XV. Results from the Hausman test may be
found in figure XLIX appendix F. Equation (63), (64) and (65) shows the model specifications:
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Ratepremiumit = β1CDSit + ai + uit, t = 1, 2, ..., T. (63)
Ratepremiumit = β1CDSit +
2015∑
k=2013
βkδk + ai + uit, t = 1, 2, ..., T. (64)
Ratepremiumit = β1CDSit +
2015∑
k=2013
βkδk +
12∑
k=1
βkδk + ai + uit, t = 1, 2, ..., T. (65)
Note that both 1 month and year 2012 is omitted to avoid multicollinearity, such that January
2012 is the constant coefficient for the third model in table XV. When implementing the seasonal
adjustments, which are all statistically significant, the coefficient of the CDS spread transcends
from being almost equal to zero and statistically insignificant to being statistically significant. As
theory would predict, the credit default swap spreads is positively correlated with the NIBOR
premium. However, from the magnitude of the CDS coefficient, there is a surprisingly small rela-
tionship between the banks’ CDS and the domestic premium in the interbank market. Our third
model, adjusting for both yearly and monthly seasonal effects predicts that a 1% increase in the
CDS spread only increases the domestic premium with 0.10%.
When adjusting for time-varying factors, our two last models confirm that there does exist a
relationship between the market price for underlying credit risk for the banks and their submit-
ted quotes. The relationship between the two variables are however quite small relative to what
one would expect. Another interesting result from the model is the size of the constant coefficient,
which relative to the effect of time-varying factors and increased CDS is quite large. The magnitude
of the constant indicates that regardless of the CDS level, there is always some added premium
between the default premium in the financing cost, and the offered interbank rate.
Regarding the causation, one can only speculate whether credit risk as a whole is reflected in the
banks CDS spreads, and thereby reflects current information on credit risk that panel banks utilise
in their calculation of the quote. Regardless of causality, there should be a correlation between the
CDS spreads and domestic premium.
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(Model 1,FE) (Model 2,RE) (Model 3,RE)
Rate premium Rate premium Rate premium
CDS -0.0210 0.0857∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.0293) (0.0336) (0.0296)
2013.Year -0.157∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗
(0.0166) (0.0155)
2014.Year 0.0211 -0.0146
(0.0190) (0.0176)
2015.Year 0.00517 -0.0320
(0.0181) (0.0170)
2.Month 0.0621∗∗∗
(0.0142)
3.Month 0.0986∗∗∗
(0.0137)
4.Month 0.0955∗∗∗
(0.0140)
5.Month 0.157∗∗∗
(0.0143)
6.Month 0.185∗∗∗
(0.0137)
7.Month 0.0663∗∗∗
(0.0140)
8.Month 0.0659∗∗∗
(0.0140)
9.Month 0.139∗∗∗
(0.0135)
10.Month 0.0282∗
(0.0138)
11.Month 0.0538∗∗∗
(0.0137)
12.Month 0.0573∗∗∗
(0.0141)
constant 0.397∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗
(0.00791) (0.0229) (0.0243)
N 825 825 825
R2
R2within 0.0006 0.4160 0.5885
R2between 0.7690 0.7690 0.7690
R2overall 0.0006 0.4118 0.5801
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Table XV Unobserved effects Models 1-3
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The previous model adjusted for constant time-varying effects, but assumed a constant rela-
tionship between CDS spread and domestic premium throughout our entire sample. Recognizing
that the marginal contribution of CDS spreads might change across time allows us to include date
specific variations in the correlation between the CDS and domestic premium. This allows us to
examine the effects of changes to governance structure of NIBOR, as we know when major gover-
nance changes were made. In the following section, we will try to examine the effect of structural
changes utilising our preceding model as a foundation, while allowing for the marginal contribution
of the CDS spread to fluctuate across time.
B. Evaluating effect of changes to governance structure
To incorporate governance effects in the model, we identify important changes to the regulatory
framework of NIBOR. The last major change in the NIBOR regulations was implemented at the end
of 2013. The important changes were increased transparency and requirements for documentation,
reducing the number of maturities from ten to five, implementing guidelines for determination of
quotes, and the introduction of the IDRs. To evaluate if the changes have influenced the relation-
ship between default premium for the banks and the domestic premium, and if the banks behave
differently subsequent to the changes of governance, we modify the model to allow for variations in
the independent variable.
By examining figure 20 again, we notice increasing difference between the domestic premium
and the CDS as of the end of 2013. As the two variables starts drifting apart, there might have
been a structural change in the relationship between our variables. This hypothesis may be subject
to further investigation by statistical testing. We tested for structural changes by using a Wald test
on a regression of the individual bank rate premium on their CDS spread. The test suggest that
there is a structural break in the relationship in the start of 2014 for all our series. Results of the
test may be found in table LI appendix F. Let us analyse these two periods separately by utilising
the same box plot illustration as we did for the entire sample in section VII.A. For simplicity and
in accordance with the structural break tests we will operate with the periods being preceding and
subsequent to 2014. Figure 22 plots the rate divided by the spread for each bank for the periods
before and after the structural break. The blue squares represents data for a given bank before
2014, while the black squares represents the period subsequent to the change.
Figure 22 illustrates how the ratio between the domestic premium and the CDS spread seem
to be quite consistent for our first period, while it for the second period seem to differ quite widely
both across and within banks. To allow the relationship between CDS and domestic premium to
vary contingent on the structural break, we include the dummy change which is equal to 1 for the
period subsequent to the structural change, along with an interaction term between this dummy
and the CDS spread variable. In order to examine our hypothesis of the structural difference being
caused by the change of governance and regulations, we also present a model which allows for the
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Figure 22. Rate premium divided by CDS spread ratio across banks and periods
change of dynamics across each of our four years to allow for gradual changes after the new gover-
nance structure. The second model contains a dummy for each given year, along with an interaction
term between the CDS and the given year. For our first model, the Hausman test suggests that we
cannot reject the effects being random, while the second model rejects the effects being random.
Results from the Hausman test may be found in table L appendix F. We thereby represent the least
square dummy variable approach for the second model, which quantifies differences across banks
of the panel. The regressions may be found in table XVI. For illustration purposes we have left
the coefficients for each month out of the regression, but note that these were also adjusted for in
the regression with quite similar results as in table XV. Equation (66) and (67) shows the model
specifications:
Ratepremiumit = β1CDSit + β2changeit + β3change× CDSit + ai + uit, t = 1, 2, ..., T. (66)
Ratepremiumit = β1CDSit +
2015∑
k=2013
βkyear.kit +
2015∑
k=2013
βkyeark ×CDSitk + ai + uit, t = 1, 2, ..., T.
(67)
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(Model 4, RE) (Model 5, FE)
Rate 6M premium Rate 6M premium
CDS 0.379∗∗∗ -0.00472
(0.0270) (0.0416)
change 0.236∗∗∗
(0.0142)
change×CDS -0.333∗∗∗
(0.0632)
2013 -0.285∗∗∗
(0.0283)
2013×CDS 0.236∗∗∗
(0.0660)
2014 -0.0339
(0.0292)
2014×CDS -0.154
(0.0991)
y2015 -0.107∗∗∗
(0.0305)
2015×CDS 0.190∗
(0.0825)
2.Bank 0.0455∗∗∗
(0.00889)
4.Bank 0.00800
(0.00874)
5.Bank 0.0171
(0.00911)
6.Bank -0.0136
(0.00887)
constant 0.0965∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗
(0.0159) (0.0291)
N 825 825
R2
R2within 0.5173 0.6013
R2between 0.5207
R2overall 0.5171
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Table XVI Unobserved effects models 4-5
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Model 4 examines the marginal contribution of the CDS spread before and after the last major
change to the NIBOR governance and structure. This model allows the market price for credit
risk to be reflected differently in the rate dependent on time. The model clearly suggests that the
relationship between changes across our panel as CDS positive while change × CDS is negative.
Observe that model 4 suggests that the coefficient for the CDS in our first period is as high as
0.379, which is almost four times as large as what model 3 predicted. What is even more inter-
esting however, is the fact that the marginal contribution of the CDS for our second period is
0.379 − 0.333 = 0.047, which is very small. This entails that the relationship between the banks’
proxied underlying credit risk and their reported interest rate quotes, although significant, is al-
most equal to zero. These results are surprising as it suggests that the influence of credit risk varies
across periods, and for periods that are more recent, the relationship between CDS and domestic
premium is almost nonexistent.
One hypothesis causing the preceding could be that the introduction of the indicative deposit
rates that makes information on other banks quotes available is taken into account when submit-
ting their own quote. This might well be involuntary, but available market information will still be
incorporated in their submission. These factors might reduce the importance of underlying credit
risk. Although observing these changes to the marginal correlation could certainly favour our hy-
pothesis of it being caused by changes done to the NIBOR regulations, it is not anywhere clear
that this is the main driver for the observed changes. Another hypothesis could be that our proxy
does not correctly capture the dynamics of the interbank market risk in Norway. Then there must
be some sort of discrepancy between the market and the banks’ conception of interbank risk within
certain time frames. Another explanation might be that there are other factors than Norwegian
interbank credit risk that explains the development of NIBOR. What seems quite clear however is
that the market price for risk should at least reflect some of the total risk in the interbank market,
and there should thereby at least be a consistent relationship between the domestic premium and
the credit risk. This does not seem to be the case.
In model 5, our last model, we incorporate yearly dynamics by allowing for changes in CDS
for each year in the sample. The coefficient for the CDS, which is the baseline in 2012, is now
not significant. A likely explanation is the low number of observations for the first year (from
October to December) compared to preceding years. Few observations within each interval is also a
weakness of model 5, as we only have a complete year for 2013 and 2014. The relationship between
CDS and domestic premium for 2014 is not significantly different from zero, and indicates the lack
of a systematic relationship between CDS and domestic premium from January 2014 to December
2014. As only half of our interaction terms are significantly different from zero, the model suggests
there are significant differences in the persistency of the relationship between an increase in the
banks’ CDS, and the increased domestic premium in the interbank rates. In addition, the Haus-
man test fails to reject that the variations between banks are random which indicates fixed effects
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across the NIBOR panel banks. A joint hypothesis of all the individual bank coefficients being
equal to zero is rejected, which indicate that there are systematical differences across banks within
our panel with respect to the relationship between their underlying credit risk and their quoted
rate. This is however, the first indication we have of there being systematic differences across banks
with regards to the relationship between their underlying credit risk and their reported interest rate.
Our results does not collectively allow us to either reject or accept our hypothesis that changes
in CDS spread and the domestic premium is linked to changes in NIBOR governance and regula-
tions. Our results however suggests that the relationship between the rate and underlying credit
risk in the Norwegian interbank market is not systematic across time. Furthermore, we only have
very small indications on there being systematic differences across the banks of the panel, which
indicates a mutual view on how individual credit risk affects the domestic premium. This could
however be a function of small differences between the rate submission from each bank, and the fact
that the underlying credit risk within each bank is mutually effected by conditions of the economy
as a whole. The results do indicate that the relationship between credit risk within the Norwegian
interbank market and the domestic premium is inconsistent over time.
C. Limitations of the unobserved effects model
Looking past the theoretical assumptions of our econometric models, which are addressed dur-
ing the introduction of our frameworks, there are some limitations with regards to applying the
framework on our underlying data. The first is that as we only have access to weekly data on the
credit default swap spreads we might lose some of the dynamics that happens within a given week.
It might enrich the analysis to apply the same framework to daily observations to increase precision
even further.
One could argue that our proxies do not adequately capture the features we want. The Treasury
bill would for instance not be completely risk-free, and thereby subtracting it might capture some of
the premium. This property is hard to bypass, and would in that case reduce the size of the NIBOR
domestic premium. Furthermore, it could be that our credit default swaps do not capture credit
risk in the underlying bank. However, studies such as the one by Chiramonte and Casu (2010),
who examined a wide panel of European banks suggest that CDS spreads reflect risk captured by
balance sheet ratios.
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D. The hidden markov model
Previous results indicate that NIBOR is higher than the financing cost in foreign currency, and
that the relationship between the domestic premium and credit default risk is inconsistent over
time. By uncovering characteristics of the interest rate in the shortest time frame possible, we can
see whether there are consistencies between the banks perception of interest rate movements. If
there is a consistent opinion among the panel banks, there must be a mutual perception on the
development of the rate. In order to investigate the short term patterns, we use the HMM on the
indicative deposit rates (IDR). The idea is that the HMM recursively trains forth the best model
based on what it observes within the specified time frame.
To implement the HMM, we need to define which part of our data that corresponds to the five
elements of the model. We will start by assuming that the hidden states represent the individual
banks, denoting the states S = [S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6]. This assumption allows for the real model on
long term to differ from what we see within our sample. We will utilise the empirical information
on the state distribution when addressing initialization of the model. By this definition the state
transition matrix A = aij is a 6×6 matrix, where we allow for the possibility to transition from any
given bank Si to any Sj , and hence aij > 0 ∀ i, j. This implies that after Bank 1 has submitted
an indicative quote, either Bank 1 can submit the next indicative quote, or we can transition to
one of the other banks to submit an indicative quote. Matrix pi denotes the probability of a bank
to be the first observation within a sequence. We further define the observation symbols V to be
the change between the current quote, and the previous quote from the same bank. We choose to
use two bins, which symbolises changing the rate either up or down. By this representation we
have V = [V1, V2] = [UP,DOWN ], which entails that our symbol probability distribution matrix
B = bj(k) by definition is a 6× 2 matrix.
Before moving forward to the iterative part we need to address the choice of initial values for
the model λ = (A,B, pi). Given that we know the empirical distribution of both the states and the
observations within our sample, we will try three different paths for our initial estimates. Our first
approach will be to initiate A, B and pi according to our empirical distribution. The second ap-
proach is based on practical experience in the literature, and we initiate with uniformly distributed
A and pi matrices, while B is still based on the empirical distribution. For our third approach,
we will utilise the empirical distribution for A and pi, but for B we will assume that all the banks
behave in a similar fashion, and are thus uniformly distributed. In order to determine which model
fits our sample the best we will compare the likelihoods of the models. Note however as mentioned
that this method does not guarantee a global maximum.
In order to ensure an efficient implementation, we examined the empirical properties and com-
pared it to the properties of the fixing. Transcending to the frequency of changes distributions
in appendix A.C, we observed that there within a given day on average seem to be substantially
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more activity preceding the fixing, and especially during the first two hours of the day. Based on
the observed nature of the NIBOR fixing, we decided to apply the model on two different samples
within each day. Model 1 will be trained on the 10 last observations preceding the fixing each day,
while Model 2 will be trained on the 10 first observations within a given day.
Model 1 is important because the NIBOR fixing is based on prevailing quotes from each bank at
12:00 pm, and the model examines the last behaviours before fixing. The second model is interest-
ing because of the observed frequency distribution, as there seems to be significantly higher activity
within the first two hours of the day. As the model require fixed length observations sequences, we
removed days that did not have at least 10 observations before 12:00 pm from the sample before
applying the model. In addition to looking at two different samples, we applied the model across
three different maturities within each sample: 1 week, 3 month and 6 month. Applying the models
across maturities will bring another dimension to the analysis, and the choice of maturities are
based on wanting to have a broad variety with respect to the length of the maturity of the interest
rate.
Before introducing the models, let us recall some of the tendencies from the descriptive statistics
as this may help us get a better economic intuition on the results of the models. We observed that
the interest rate had fallen within our time frame, which would most likely lead to the majority of
the observations being negative as the aggregate change is less than zero. Furthermore there was
a clear trend that the majority of changes done to the interest rate is either one basis point up or
down. This is likely caused by banks fluctuating around two basis points, and keeps reporting one
basis point up or down, dependent on which side it tilts towards.
From the summary of frequencies for the individual banks in table XXXV in appendix F we see
that there are distinct differences in the relative frequency of changes across banks. The aggregate
data will help us identify discrepancies between the aggregated dynamics and dynamics within
our selected samples. Each model will be presented in its own section and compared to empirical
tendencies. The results from our two models will be utilised to draw up a broader picture on the
patterns of the indicative deposit rates. Lastly, we will comment on some of the limitations and
assumptions that follow the implementing the HMM on the indicative deposit rates.
E. Model 1: The last 10 quotes preceding the fixing
The logarithmic likelihoods of our three different approaches suggest that initiating with an
empirical distribution of matrix A and pi and a uniform B matrix gives the best fitting model. A
summary of the likelihoods along with a complete presentation of the model across maturities may
be found in appendix G.B. Note that the tables are read from left to right (a12 is the probability
of transitioning from Bank 1 to Bank 2, while b1(1) is the probability of observing a reduced rate
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from bank 1). There are two important components to highlight; the transition matrix between
banks, and the probabilities of the interest rate to go either up or down.
For the transition matrix, we know from the descriptive statistics that there are significant
frequency differences among banks, which is reflected in the model. Table XVII compares the em-
pirical aggregate frequency of a bank against the probability of transitioning to that bank predicted
by the model. In order to convert the latter to a probability measure, we sum a given banks column
in the transition matrix and divide by the number of banks, and the model is able to incorporate
that some banks change their interest rate more than others.
Table XVII Probability of observing given bank
Maturity/Bank SEB DDB NDA SWD DNM SHB
1 week
Model 0.1480 0.1357 0.2294 0.1752 0.1288 0.1828
Empirical 0.1316 0.2107 0.2806 0.066 0.1001 0.2103
Difference 0.0164 -0.0750 -0.0512 0.1092 0.0287 -0.0275
3 month
Model 0.1658 0.1390 0.2315 0.1360 0.1327 0.1950
Empirical 0.1619 0.1193 0.3170 0.0619 0.1220 0.2177
Difference 0.0039 0.0197 -0.0855 0.0741 0.0107 -0.0227
6 month
Model 0.1310 0.2310 0.1954 0.1025 0.1750 0.1652
Empirical 0.0926 0.2471 0.3204 0.0459 0.1444 0.1498
Difference 0.0384 -0.0161 -0.1250 0.0566 0.0306 0.0154
There is mostly marginal differences between the predicted bank contribution frequency and
the empirical distribution of our entire sample, except for NDA and SWD. NDA, although still
quite dominant, seem to be less active in the last period before fixing relative to their average
contribution during the whole day. SWD’s behaviour is opposite as their participation during the
last 10 is significantly higher than their average day. This difference suggests that the frequency of
bank changes are more evenly distributed preceding the fixing compared to the aggregate empirical
data over the whole day. The dominance of NDA is also reflected in table XVIII, which shows the
initial state distribution across maturities.
Table XVIII Initial state distribution
Maturity / Bank SEB DDB NDA SWD DNM SHB
1 Week 0.0789 0.0239 0.6192 0.0318 0.0520 0.1941
3 Month 0.0853 0.0360 0.5438 0.0203 0.0947 0.2199
6 Month 0.0439 0.0253 0.4708 0.0098 0.3971 0.0531
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Looking more specifically at the transition matrices in appendix G.B there seems to be a rel-
atively high probability of back-to-back observations from the same bank. This seems to be a
consequence of the two decimal precision of the data, which as mentioned in the introduction leads
to a bank reporting a changed interest rate when it fluctuates between two basis points. This
indicates that the last changes before fixing are relatively small in size, and is supported by the
symbol probability distributions across maturities in table XIX, which are all very close to being
uniformly distributed across all maturities.
Table XIX Symbol probability distributions across maturities
Table XX 1 Week
Bank Rate down Rate up
SEB 0.5226 0.4774
DDB 0.4977 0.5023
NDA 0.5135 0.4865
SWD 0.4987 0.5013
DNM 0.5066 0.4934
SHB 0.5211 0.4789
Table XXI 3 Month
Rate down Rate up
0.4902 0.5098
0.4988 0.5012
0.4801 0.5199
0.5016 0.4984
0.4971 0.5029
0.4774 0.5226
Table XXII 6 Month
Rate down Rate up
0.4796 0.5204
0.5104 0.4896
0.4929 0.5071
0.5056 0.4944
0.4880 0.5120
0.4827 0.5173
For the part of the sample preceding the fixing, there seems to be quite a coinciding opinion
across banks regarding the development of the rate. This claim mostly is based on the uniformity of
the distribution of changes, which indicate that the participants on average have the same opinion
regarding the last development of the interest rate before fixing. Although it can not be excluded
that they always move in the opposite direction, and that they thereby on average have the same
distribution, it is very unlikely. The similarities are likely to be caused by small changes within the
last quotes preceding as the panel banks are fluctuating between two basis points. This indicates
that the last quotes before the fixing does not cause for radical changes in the interest rate, and
the behaviour of the panel banks last change before fixing is homogeneous.
F. Model 2: The first 10 quotes of the day
The logarithmic likelihoods for model 2 suggests the second approach, initiating with uniformly
distributed A and pi matrix, and an empirical B matrix. For this particular model, we will also
give note to our pi matrix, as it now yields some interesting information regarding which bank has
the highest probability of having the first interest rate change of the day. A complete presentation
of the likelihoods as well as the preferred models across maturities may be found in appendix G.C.
Looking at the properties of the transition matrices in a similar fashion as the previous section,
observe from table XXIII that there seems to be quite significant differences between what the
model predicts and the underlying empirical distribution for the whole sample. Especially SWD,
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which is the bank of the panel that empirically is the least frequent changer of their interest rate, is
predicted by the model to be the most likely bank to be observed both for the shortest and longest
maturity. Looking at the relative activity across both banks and maturities, the model indicates
the activity level being quite evenly distributed across our panel banks. High activity among all the
banks subsequent to the opening is also intuitive, as these early quotes would have incorporated
information generated since the closing on the previous day.
Table XXIII Probability of observing given bank
Maturity/Bank SEB DDB NDA SWD DNM SHB
1 week
Model 0.1691 0.1559 0.1512 0.2349 0.1446 0.1442
Empirical 0.1316 0.2107 0.2806 0.066 0.1001 0.2103
Difference 0.0375 -0.0548 -0.1294 0.1689 0.0445 -0.0661
3 month
Model 0.1828 0.1818 0.1882 0.1494 0.1472 0.1507
Empirical 0.1619 0.1193 0.3170 0.0619 0.1220 0.2177
Difference 0.0209 0.0625 -0.1288 0.0875 0.0252 -0.0670
6 month
Model 0.1503 0.1514 0.1496 0.2167 0.1901 0.1419
Empirical 0.0926 0.2471 0.3204 0.0459 0.1444 0.1498
Difference 0.0577 -0.0903 -0.1708 0.1708 0.0457 -0.0079
The state transition matrices in appendix G.C suggest that the probability of having repeated
observations from a given bank is not more likely than observing two different banks, but quite
the contrary. This is another indication which supports the distribution in table XXIII where all
banks have a high probability of being observed during the first 10 observations. The initial state
distribution matrix also supports the distribution, as there is seemingly no consistency in which
bank has the first quote each day across maturities. Observe from table XXIV that the probability
of a given bank being first differs widely across maturities, and that all our banks except SHB seem
to frequently have the first observation for at least one maturity.
Table XXIV Initial state distribution
Maturity / Bank SEB DDB NDA SWD DNM SHB
1 Week 0.3331 0.0834 0.0561 0.4694 0.0285 0.0294
3 Month 0.2312 0.2963 0.3914 0.0157 0.0298 0.0357
6 Month 0.0268 0.0273 0.0155 0.4345 0.4825 0.0135
Assuming that there is sufficient activity across all banks in the opening of a given day, we
can investigate how the different banks interpret the changes in the interest rate from yesterday’s
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closing to the first contrition. This is an indicator of whether the banks perceive the short term
development of the interest rate over night in a similar fashion. Table XXV shows the rate change
distribution across the banks of the panel. This table has some interesting characteristics across
the respective maturities. Observe especially that the relative probabilities of changing the rate
either up or down varies widely across banks.
Table XXV Symbol probability distributions across maturities
Table XXVI 1 Week
Bank Rate down Rate up
SEB 0.8199 0.1801
DDB 0.7469 0.2531
NDA 0.6904 0.3096
SWD 0.0788 0.9212
DNM 0.4425 0.5575
SHB 0.4761 0.5239
Table XXVII 3 Month
Rate down Rate up
0.8911 0.1089
0.9056 0.0944
0.1272 0.8728
0.5771 0.4229
0.3476 0.6524
0.3065 0.6935
Table XXVIII 6 Month
Rate down Rate up
0.7185 0.2815
0.7263 0.2737
0.3339 0.6661
0.0918 0.9082
0.9014 0.0986
0.4312 0.5688
This observation is quite interesting, as there seems to be little consistency among the banks
regarding which way the rate should move. Having observed that the frequencies vary quite signifi-
cantly across banks within a given maturity could be an indication of the banks not having the same
perception of how new information should be incorporated in the interest rate. However, it could
also be that the banks face different information or lending costs within that given day and that
it thereby varies significantly across the participants. There are some cases of banks having quite
significantly different distributions across maturities. This seems odd, but might be explained by
the bank having a different perspectives on the risk across the maturities. It might also be caused
by limitations of the model, which will be addressed in section VII.H.
G. Comparative model analysis
So far, we have looked separately at two empirically and structural interesting parts of the day
which have proven to have very different characteristics. In the following section, we will draw on
the observed attributes from our two models to acquire a broader picture on the patterns of the
indicative deposit rates.
The first interesting observation is the different distribution of changes between the two periods.
The perception of what direction the interest rate should evolve differs widely between the banks
at the start of the day, while it preceding to the fixing seem to be more of an agreement. These
very differences might be explained by incorporation of all the information that has come in hand
subsequent to the closing the previous day being incorporated in the start of the day. It is also
an indication that information seems to be quite instantly incorporated in the interest rate level.
Iterating even further, the information does not only influence the interest rate, but it seems to
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influence the interest rate differently with respect to direction across our banks.
Examining this difference even further, we review the empirical properties which may enrich
the understanding of the model results. What is highly relevant is the relative size at which the
information effects the interest rate. Observe by figure 23 that among the 10 first observations
there are almost twice as many changes larger than 1 basis point across all maturities compared
to the 10 observations preceding the fixing. The empirical distribution thereby suggest that there
are the rate is more volatile during the start of the day. Incorporating this with the results of
the previous paragraph suggests not only volatility, but that the differences across banks are not
only coincidences based on fluctuating between two basis points. Knowing that the distribution of
changes differ across banks during the start of the day, and that the changes are of significant sizes,
we have results indicating that the perception of the short term development of the interest rate
differs across our panel.
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Figure 23. Number of changes larger than 1 basis points, by sample
Another interesting result is that the relative impact on the interest rate for the periods seem
quite different. While for the period preceding the fixing there seems to be mutual agreement con-
cerning the direction and development of the interest rate, there is a wide difference in the opening
of the day. This suggest that a vast majority of the factors influencing is incorporated during the
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start of the day, and indicates that the first quotes, regardless of contributor, will indicate the base-
line for the interest rate that day. This period is thus decisive for the outcome of the NIBOR fixing.
Based on these results, it is peculiar that even though information seem to be incorporated in
such a different manner across the panel banks, the rates seem to follow each other quite accurately
in the long run. Observing such a tendency could be an indication that banks continuously include
previously submitted quotes in their information set. Taking that information into account is in
fact reasonable, as it contains relevant information concerning other banks.
The causation of the observations found by utilising the HMM are not clear, but what seems
evident is that banks perceive the short term development of the interest rate differently. This
could entail that they either misinterpret the information, or that they have a different perception
of what and how a given piece of information effects the rate. As they all follow the same long
term trend however, these differences seem to diminish, which is peculiar if they react different to
influencing factors.
H. Limitations of the hidden markov model
There are some obvious limitations concerning the application of the HMM on the indicative
deposit rates. Although the states are dependent on previous states, the observed values are as-
sumed independent of each other. Assuming that all our banks consider the same information
when quoting their interest rate, it is highly unlikely that this assumption holds. Even if they
did not consider the same information, it is still likely that they take information on other quotes
into account, which in the end would lead to the observations being dependent. Another assump-
tion which might be violated, is that there is dependence among the order of banks quoting their
interest rate. It is not unlikely that the banks of the NIBOR panel report only based on their
own information. However, one could infer that taking information on other banks quotes into ac-
count would make their rate change dependent on how the other participants behave in the market.
The most important limitation to emphasize is however, the fact that we have no guarantee
for the model being the global maximum of our likelihood function. As its surface is complex and
contains multiple maximum, iterating to the nearest local maximum does not anyway guarantee a
globally optimal solution. Although we try three different initial estimates, this would only limit
our error to some extent. It will only make sure that we are at least not selecting the local maxi-
mum with the lowest likelihood value. As we estimate 54 parameters, the surface of the likelihood
function is highly complex, which makes it very difficult to verify whether we have selected the
global optimum. The results are thereby dependent on our three selected approaches.
From a practical point of view, the precision of the data with respect to only being reported
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with a two decimal accuracy also limits some of the possible insights from the model. If the pre-
cision was better, the number of bins could have been expanded, and thereby accrue even richer
dynamics in the model. The reported data also suffers from low precision, as if one of the panel
banks fluctuate between two basis points, it keeps reporting one basis point up or down dependent
on which side it tilts towards. Had the reporting contained even more decimals, the analysis could
be even more precise.
Although there are some limitations concerning the application the HMM on the IDRs, the
intent of the model was to apply a framework that allowed us to quantify short term market dy-
namics. Other presentations of such high frequency IDRs has earlier only been done in a descriptive
manner, which obviously also has certain limitations concerning getting a good understanding of
the dynamics of the data. One needs to exercise caution and be critical to observed results, but
the quantification is still heavily based on underlying data, regardless of whether it is a local or a
global maximum.
I. Partial conclusion
This section has investigated the microstructure of NIBOR in order to determine how the struc-
ture and governance of NIBOR effect the participants’ contribution to the interest rate. We address
the question along two dimensions; a long term dimension using an unobserved effects framework
on the individual quotes that constitute the fixing, and a short term dimension using a hidden
markov model on the high frequency indicative deposit rates.
Our first results suggest that the relationship between NIBOR and underlying credit risk in
the Norwegian interbank market is inconsistent. This inconsistent relationship is mutual across the
panel banks as there are no fixed effects present. We can neither reject nor accept the hypothesis
of whether the inconsistency across time has been caused by the last structural change. A mutual
perception of the inconsistent relationship is however peculiar as the rate should reflect conditions
in the Norwegian interbank market which we proxy with the market price for credit risk.
Regarding the short term dimension, we focus on two important periods of the day. We analyse
the changes in interest rates during opening hours, and the last changes preceding the fixing. Our
results suggest that changes during the beginning of the day has the highest impact on the out-
come of the daily fixing. This is likely a consequence of new information overnight being directly
incorporated in the interest rate. Analysing the first daily changes indicates that information is
being incorporated in very different ways across banks. This could very well be caused by misin-
terpreting the effect of the new information set, but it does however suggests that there is not a
mutual agreement on how economic factors should effect the rate within a very short time frame.
Although there are short term inconsistencies with respect to the development of the rate, the rate
seems to have the same long term trend across the banks of the panel. This suggests that the
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differences that occur during the morning are diminishing. A possible reason could be bias from
observing quotes from other participants.
We find inconsistencies in the microstructure of NIBOR that might suggest that the structure
and governance of NIBOR does not provide sufficient guidelines to ensure that the banks have the
same perception of factors effecting the interest rate.
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VIII. Conclusion
This paper has examined the nature and causes of the Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate. By
studying NIBOR in a domestic and cross-country perspective, we have investigated whether NIBOR
has similar characteristics as comparable money market rates, such as EURIBOR and STIBOR.
Digging deeper into the structure and governance of NIBOR has enabled us to get a broader un-
derstanding of the underlying process that determines the outcome of the interest rate. In the
concluding remarks of the paper, we utilise the results from our analysis to describe the dynamics
of NIBOR. Based on these results, we furthermore present possible changes to the NIBOR regu-
lations. We believe these changes may address some of the issues highlighted in the paper, and
increase the quality and accuracy of the interbank rate. Lastly, we discuss and suggest interesting
future research on the subject.
A. The structure and behaviour of NIBOR
We evaluate whether NIBOR accurately reflects the lending cost in the Norwegian interbank
market by comparing it to other interbank rates in both foreign and domestic currencies. To pro-
vide sufficient answers to this question, we used the yield curve model introduced by Nelson-Siegel.
To confirm that the model is consistent with the behaviour of the interest rate, and fits observa-
tions out of the estimation sample, we performed an out-of-sample forecast. Interesting result from
the Nelson-Siegel model were evaluated again using the Vasicek short-rate model to ensure that
different aspects of interest rate theory produce coinciding results.
When comparing domestic money markets, we observed that domestic financing cost in curren-
cies NIBOR banks are present are not the same, which supports differences between the interbank
rates. The results regarding the relationship between the domestic financing cost in the Norwegian
money market and the offered interbank rate was inconclusive. We observed similar discrepancies
between the domestic interbank rates and domestic financing costs for the Norwegian banks in
Sweden and the eurozone. This made us unable to determine if banks contributing to NIBOR are
more or less accurate in the Norwegian interbank market, compared to other interbank markets
they are present in.
When exploring the behaviour of interbank rates in the same foreign currency, euros, the Nor-
wegian banks contributing to NIBOR and STIBOR were compared to an independent sample of
European banks contributing to EURIBOR. The financing cost, regardless of the banks’ origin
were observed as the same, and we concluded that banks face equal financing costs in the European
money market. When comparing currency adjusted interbank rates to the European financing
cost, we observed a discrepancy between the interbank rates. NIBOR has consistently been quoted
higher than both STIBOR and EURIBOR, this difference can not be justified by higher financing
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cost.
To check the validity of the results regarding the discrepancy between foreign financing cost and
swapped interbank rates, we estimated the Vasicek model on a new sample of bonds maturing in
the future. When estimating the Vasicek model on a new sample of bonds out of the Nelson-Siegel
estimation period, we observed coinciding results. Estimated bond prices based on interbank rate
dynamics were lower than the actual bond prices. This indicates that the underlying interest rate
in the banks’ bonds are lower than what we observe in the interbank market.
By applying the unobserved effects model on the microstructure of NIBOR we found inconsis-
tencies across time in the relationship between the domestic premium and underlying credit risk
using credit default swaps for each individual bank. This inconsistency is mutual across all the
banks in the panel. The lack of a consistent relationship between default risk and domestic pre-
mium is one possible explanation for the observed discrepancy between the banks’ financing cost
and the interbank rate. It is peculiar that the domestic premium in the Norwegian money market
does not have a consistent relationship with the underlying risk of default. There are no apparent
patterns in the inconsistency, the relationship seems inconclusive.
Digging deeper into the short term development of NIBOR using the hidden markov model, we
find differences in behaviour when facing new information during opening hours. These differences
seem to be diminishing in the long run, which could possibly be caused by bias from observing
quotes from other participants. Taking quotes from other participants into account is reasonable,
as they provide useful information regarding other participants in the Norwegian interbank market.
The results from analysing intraday development of the interbank rate uncovers a possible weak-
ness in the governance structure, as the interpretation of information varies among the participants.
Furthermore, we found that the magnitude of the changes closer to fixing are decreasing, which
entails that the the first quotes are most important for the daily fixing of NIBOR.
B. Suggestions for improving NIBOR
What seems to be the most evident weakness of NIBOR is that it opens for individual opinions
from all the contributing participants. These individual opinions do not only allow for misinterpre-
tation of what the interest rate should reflect, but also makes evaluating the correctness of quotes
a very difficult task. In the following section we propose changes that we, based on our results,
believe could improve trustworthiness, correctness and transparency of NIBOR. We will suggest a
variety of changes ranked by their extensiveness.
The first and least radical suggestion would be to make the IDRs invisible. The findings from
applying the hidden markov model indicated that participants seem to have quite different percep-
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tions regarding impacts of information accumulated since the previous day, which has a tendency
to diminish over time. Banks might be influenced by the observable rates form other panel banks
when submitting own quotes, which makes their contribution biased by other things than their own
financing cost. Removing the IDRs would be one solution to ensure that quotes at least within a
given day are independent of quotes from other participants.
To facilitate the evaluation of the historical quotes’ correctness, another suggestion would be to
require panel banks to document their lending cost. This would simplify the process of separating
funding costs and premium, which makes it easier for the compliance committees’ job to evaluate
the accuracy of NIBOR.
Transcending to a more radical change, transitioning to an interbank regime where the banks
are financially accountable for their submitted quotes would increase the consequences of quoting
incorrect or inaccurate interest rates. A financial binding regime could be implemented in a variety
of ways, such as introducing a specified monetary amount the banks are obliged to borrow, or lend
to, within a span of their submitted quote. As it is unfair to expect that banks are able to quote their
lending cost within one basis point, there should be some wiggle room for the precision of the quote.
The most radical and drastic change we present to increase the trustworthiness of the interbank
rate is based on limiting the number of individual opinions involved with fixing NIBOR. We ob-
served the lack of a common perception of what effects the short term development NIBOR, and
a discrepancy between NIBOR and other interbank rates, even though the bank financing cost is
the same. This discrepancy was not consistently driven by underlying credit risk. Based on this, it
seems reasonable to claim that individual opinions and market interaction reduce the correctness of
NIBOR. A solution to the problem could then be to incorporate an independent third party in the
fixing process. The third party could either calculate an official benchmark directly comparable to
NIBOR, or be assigned to calculate specific components of NIBOR, such as the premium exceeding
financing cost.
C. Future research
Within the scope of evaluating the accuracy of interest rates, other interest rate models with
time-dependent volatility, two and three-factor models are applicable on interbank rates to gain
further insights in the dynamics of interest rates for unsecured loans. This paper has only evaluated
if there exists a discrepancy between the financing cost for banks and their offered interest rate,
not elaborated further on the magnitude or causes for an added premium across currencies. Topics
involving identifying why this deviation exists is arguably more interesting than pointing out their
existence, but has not been possible within the boundaries of this paper.
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Iterating even further on the perspective of why, it would have enriched the analysis with re-
spect to understanding the effects of governance changes if we had examined the individual quotes
even further back in time. This data has however proven to be very difficult to accrue. This would
enable a more comprehensive analysis of the effects of previous changes to the governance structure.
Having benchmarks on changes would entail a deeper understanding of how changes to structure
and governance has affected the participants.
For the last part of our second chapter, we combined elements from interest rate quotes and
pattern recognition models on high frequency data. Pattern recognition has been applied on equity
prices with mixed results, but is still an underdeveloped research area within financial economics.
Interesting topics for future research within pattern recognition is identifying human behaviour in
financial markets, such as in this paper with the indicative deposit rates. There has been increasing
interest for behavioral finance and human decision making during the 21st century, but has yet to
be approached using more advanced pattern recognition models.
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Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics
Appendix A. Interbank rates
Table XXIX Descriptive statistics for STIBOR
Maturity(months) Time Period (obs) Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
0.03 20.10.2000 - 28.04.2015 2.27 1.41 -0.30 6.48
(3788)
0.23 20.10.2000 - 28.04.2015 2.32 1.40 -0.28 6.08
(3788)
1 20.10.2000 - 28.04.2015 2.37 1.40 -0.28 5.4
(3788)
2 20.10.2000 - 28.04.2015 2.42 1.40 -0.25 5.45
(3788)
3 20.10.2000 - 28.04.2015 2.48 1.40 -0.22 5.60
(3788)
6 20.10.2000 - 28.04.2015 2.58 1.38 -0.16 5.60
(3788)
9 20.10.2000 - 01.03.2013 2.99 1.22 0.90 5.64
(3226)
12 20.10.2000 - 01.03.2013 3.08 1.22 0.95 5.78
(3226)
Note: Number of observations in parentheses.
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Table XXX Descriptive statistics for EURIBOR
Maturity(months) Time Period (obs) Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
0.23 20.10.2000 - 28.04.2015 1.98 1.57 -0.09 5.17
(3788)
0.47 15.10.2001 - 28.04.2015 1.81 1.44 -0.07 5.04
(3532)
0.70 15.10.2001 - 31.10.2013 2.04 1.39 0.09 5.05
(3144)
1 20.10.2000 - 28.04.2015 2.05 1.57 -0.03 5.20
(3788)
2 20.10.2000 - 28.04.2015 2.11 1.57 -0.02 5.25
(3788)
3 20.10.2000 - 28.04.2015 2.18 1.55 -0.01 5.39
(3788)
4 20.10.2000 - 31.10.2013 2.44 1.45 0.22 5.42
(3442)
5 20.10.2000 - 31.10.2013 2.48 1.43 0.26 5.43
(3442)
6 20.10.2000 - 28.04.2015 2.28 1.50 0.06 5.45
(3788)
7 20.10.2000 - 31.10.2013 2.54 1.40 0.32 5.46
(2282)
8 20.10.2000 - 31.10.2013 2.56 1.38 0.35 5.47
(2282)
9 20.10.2000 - 28.04.2015 2.36 1.47 0.11 5.48
(3226)
10 20.10.2000 - 31.10.2013 2.61 1.36 0.42 5.49
(2282)
11 20.10.2000 - 31.10.2013 2.64 1.35 0.44 5.50
(2282)
12 20.10.2000 - 28.04.2015 2.44 1.44 0.17 5.53
(3788)
Note: Number of observations in parentheses.
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Appendix B. NIBOR fixing quotes
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Figure 24. Spread between highest and lowest quote for the NIBOR fixings
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Figure 25. Distribution of banks with highest quote
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Figure 26. Distribution of banks with lowest quote
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Appendix C. Indicative deposit rates
Table XXXV Panel bank relative frequency
interest rate Time period SWD SHB SEB NDA DNM DDB
1 week 09.12.2013 - 22.09.2015 0.066 0.2103 0.1316 0.2806 0.1001 0.2107
(21213) (1413) (4461) (2792) (5953) (2124) (4470)
1 month 09.12.2013 - 22.09.2015 0.0594 0.2125 0.1356 0.2826 0.1137 0.1961
(21967) (1305) (4669) (2979) (6208) (2498) (4308)
2 month 09.12.2013 - 22.09.2015 0.0627 0.2266 0.1333 0.3097 0.1314 0.1362
(20420) (1281) (4628) (2722) (6324) (2684) (2781)
3 month 09.12.2013 - 22.09.2015 0.0619 0.2177 0.1619 0.3170 0.1220 0.1193
(20649) (1279) (4496) (3344) (6546) (2520) (2464)
6 month 09.12.2013 - 22.09.2015 0.0459 0.1498 0.0926 0.3204 0.1444 0.2471
(27737) (1272) (4154) (2568) (8886) (4004) (6853)
Aggregate 09.12.2013 - 22.09.2015 0.0585 0.2001 0.1286 0.3029 0.1235 0.1864
(111986) (6550) (22408) (14405) (33917) (13830) (20876)
Note: Number of observations in parentheses
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Figure 27. Distribution frequency of changes
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Figure 28. Distribution interest rate change size
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Appendix D. Credit default swaps
Table XXXVI Descriptive statistics CDS
Table XXXVII Across time
CDS spread mean std.dev max min
2012 55.77 24.11 133.28 19.45
2013 24.82 9.76 59.46 8.77
2014 14.281 6.10 28.78 4.36
2015 18.377 7.62 35.57 6.28
Table XXXVIII Across banks
CDS spread mean std.dev max min
SHB 13.71 8.13 35.57 4.35
DNM 25.05 7.50 59.76 16.44
SEB 21.29 15.17 83.83 6.13
SWD 23.84 20.15 101.74 7.06
DDB 26.42 15.38 133.28 9.62
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Appendix B. Mathematical proofs
Appendix A. Solution to non-linear least squares for Nelson-Siegel model
Let our objective function be f(θ, β1, β2, β3) that satisfy the condition of a C
2 function (thus
non-linear). The corresponding non-linear least squares problem is
min
n∑
i=1
(yi − f(θ, β1, β2, β3))2 (B1)
As this is an unrestricted optimization problem it will not have a set of solutions that satisfy (for
simplicity, let the parameters be noted gi:
n∑
i=1
∂f(gi)
∂gi
= 0 (B2)
In order to find a solution we use Newtons Method using a first order Taylor expansion for some
initial value
f(gi) ≈ f(g0i ) +
n∑
i=1
∂f(g0i )
∂gi
(
gi − g0i
)
(B3)
Using this approximation technique our solution wil be the closes local/global minimum in the
neighbourhood of g0i . To determine if the solution is local or global we evaluate the Hessian matrix
H =

∂2f
∂θ2
∂2f
∂θ∂β1
∂2f
∂θ∂β2
∂2f
∂θ∂β3
∂2f
∂β1∂θ
∂2f
∂β21
∂2f
∂β1∂β2
∂2f
∂β1∂β3
∂2f
∂β2∂θ
∂2f
∂β2∂β1
∂2f
∂β22
∂2f
∂β2∂β3
∂2f
∂β3∂θ
∂2f
∂β3∂β1
∂2f
∂β3∂β2
∂2f
∂β23

Appendix B. Expectation for Vasicek model
Let dr(t) = k(θ − r(t))dt + σdW (t) and introduce the transformation f(t, r(t)) = r(t)ekt. By
Ito’s lemma we can derive the stochastic differential equation for f :
df(t, r(t)) =
(
r(t)kekt + ektk(θ − r(t))
)
dt+ ektσdW (t) (B4)
r(t)ekt =
∫ t
0
r(t)keksds+
∫ t
0
eksk(θ − r(t))ds+
∫ t
0
σeksdW (t) (B5)
With boundary condition r(0) = r we derive the explicit solution for the integral
r(t) = r(0)e−kt + (1− e−kt)θ + σe−kt
∫ t
0
eksdW (t) (B6)
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From this we can derive the expectation and variance for rt. As E[Wt] = 0 and Var[Wt] = t by
construction:
E0[rt] = E0
[
r(0)e−kt + (1− e−kt)θ + σe−kt
∫ t
0
eksdW (t)
]
= r(0)e−kt + (1− e−kt)θ (B7)
Var[rt] = Var
[
σe−kt
∫ t
0
eksdW (t)
]
= σ2e−2kt
∫ t
0
e2ksds =
σ2
2k
(
1− e−2kt
)
(B8)
the expectation and variance is useful when we want to derive a price for instruments with interest
rate as the underlying. Recall the formal definition of a zero coupon bond value at time t
P (t) = P (T )e−ytT (T−t). (B9)
The value of receiving PT at time T is equal to Et[Pt] = Et[PT e
− ∫ Tt r(s)ds]. From our original
stochastic differential equation we know that Wt has Gaussian increments, and thus rt is normally
distributed - and E[ert ] follows a log-normal distribution eµ+
1
2
σ2 . For PT = 0 our expectation for
the bond price is
Et[e
− ∫ Tt r(s)ds] = eEt[− ∫ Tt rsds]+ 12Vart[− ∫ Tt rsds] (B10)
For t = 0 we can derive the price of a bond by finding E0[−
∫ T
0 rsds] and Var0[−
∫ T
0 rsds].
E0
[
−
∫ T
t
rsds
]
= E0[(r0 − θ) 1
k
(1− e−kT + θT +
∫ T
0
σ
k
(1− e−k(T−s)dWs)
E0
[
−
∫ T
t
rsds
]
= (r0 − θ) 1
k
(1− e−kt) + θT (B11)
Var0
[
−
∫ T
t
rsds
]
= Var0
[∫ T
0
σ
k
(1− e−k(T−s))dWs
]
Var0
[
−
∫ T
t
rsds
]
=
(σ
k
)2 ∫ T
0
(1− e−k(T−s))2ds
Var0
[
−
∫ T
t
rsds
]
=
(σ
k
)2(∫ T
0
ds− 2
∫ T
0
e−2k(T−s)ds+
∫ T
0
e−2k(T−s)ds
)
Var0
[
−
∫ T
t
rsds
]
=
(σ
k
)2(
T − 21
k
(1− e−kT ) + 1
2k
(1− e−2kT )
)
(B12)
Now we can derive the solution for the bond price
E0[e
− ∫ T0 rsds] = exp
(
−(r0 − θ) 1
k
(
1− e−kT
)
− θT + 1
2
(σ
k
)2(
T − 2
k
(
1− e−kT
)
+
1
2k
(
1− e−2kT
)))
(B13)
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Appendix C. The Nelson-Siegel model
Appendix A. Fitted samples of the yield curve
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Figure 29. Estimated and actual yield for selected dates, NIBOR.
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Figure 30. Estimated and actual yield for selected dates, STIBOR.
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Figure 31. Estimated and actual yield for selected dates, EURIBOR.
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Appendix B. Estimated factors over time for interbank rates
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Figure 32. Estimated loading for factor β1
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Figure 34. Estimated loading for factor β3
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Appendix C. Descriptive statistics for residuals
Table XXXIX Descriptive statistics for NIBOR
Maturity Mean StdDev Min Max MAE RMSE
0.23 0.015 0.0664 -0.7592 0.8 0.015 0.068
0.47 0.0049 0.0571 -0.4416 0.7278 0.0049 0.0573
1 0.0046 0.0743 -1.2802 0.6542 0.0046 0.0744
2 0.0068 0.0398 -0.3467 0.2667 0.0068 0.0404
3 -0.0121 0.0355 -0.4282 0.3937 0.0121 0.0375
6 -0.0038 0.0424 -0.3191 0.2955 0.0038 0.0426
9 0.01 0.0375 -0.2415 0.2715 0.01 0.0388
12 -0.0042 0.033 -0.2247 0.2158 0.0042 0.0333
Table XL Descriptive statistics for yield curve residuals, STIBOR
Maturity Mean StdDev Min Max MAE RMSE
0.03 0.0207 0.0511 -0.868 0.2568 0.0207 0.0551
0.23 -0.008 0.035 -0.1521 0.6522 0.008 0.0359
1 -0.0122 0.044 -0.3433 0.4382 0.0122 0.0456
2 -0.0006 0.0285 -0.1303 0.2167 0.0006 0.0285
3 -0.0111 0.0267 -0.1026 0.0447 0.0111 0.0289
6 0.011 0.0288 -0.2117 0.1541 0.011 0.0308
9 0.009 0.0292 -0.1146 0.1127 0.009 0.0306
12 -0.0087 0.0239 -0.1109 0.1357 0.0087 0.0255
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Table XLI Descriptive statistics for EURIBOR
Maturity Mean StdDev Min Max MAE RMSE
0.23 0.0072 0.0427 -0.1976 0.6065 0.0072 0.0433
0.47 0.0063 0.027 -0.241 0.3847 0.0063 0.0277
0.7 0.0047 0.0266 -0.3965 0.2267 0.0047 0.027
1 -0.0035 0.04 -0.442 0.1265 0.0035 0.0401
2 -0.0065 0.0407 -0.2737 0.087 0.0065 0.0412
3 -0.0199 0.0349 -0.1815 0.0366 0.0199 0.0402
4 -0.007 0.0141 -0.0725 0.0202 0.007 0.0157
5 0.0019 0.0093 -0.0261 0.0605 0.0019 0.0095
6 0.0015 0.0192 -0.041 0.1027 0.0015 0.0193
7 0.0095 0.0208 -0.0408 0.1173 0.0095 0.0229
8 0.0123 0.0192 -0.0376 0.1039 0.0123 0.0228
9 0.009 0.0134 -0.0237 0.0685 0.009 0.0162
10 0.0049 0.0056 -0.007 0.026 0.0049 0.0074
11 -0.0032 0.0093 -0.05 0.0192 0.0032 0.0099
12 -0.0141 0.0231 -0.1364 0.0481 0.0141 0.0271
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Appendix D. Corporate bonds
Appendix A. Bonds in NOK
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Figure 35. Comparison of bonds in NOK to estimated NIBOR.
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Figure 36. Comparison of bonds in NOK to estimated NIBOR.
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Appendix B. Bonds in SEK
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Figure 37. Comparison of bonds in NOK to estimated STIBOR.
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Appendix C. Bonds in EUR
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Figure 38. Comparison of bonds in EUR to estimated EURIBOR.
122
Time to maturity
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Y
ie
ld
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
Estimation for bond:6308T4
Bond based yield
EURIBOR based yield
Actual EURIBOR quotes
Time to maturity
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Y
ie
ld
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Estimation for bond:6465FR
Bond based yield
EURIBOR based yield
Actual EURIBOR quotes
Figure 39. Comparison of bonds in EUR to estimated EURIBOR.
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Appendix D. Bonds swapped to EUR
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Figure 40. Comparison of bonds in EUR to estimated swapped NIBOR.
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Figure 41. Comparison of bonds in EUR to estimated swapped NIBOR.
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Figure 42. Comparison of bonds in EUR to estimated swapped NIBOR.
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Figure 43. Comparison of bonds in EUR to estimated swapped NIBOR.
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Figure 44. Comparison of bonds in EUR to estimated swapped STIBOR.
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Figure 45. Comparison of bonds in EUR to estimated swapped STIBOR.
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Appendix E. Autoregressive model
Appendix A. Autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation
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Figure 46. Partial autocorrelation function for NIBOR.
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Figure 47. Autocorrelation function for NIBOR.
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Figure 48. Partial autocorrelation function for STIBOR.
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Figure 49. Autocorrelation function for STIBOR.
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Partial autocorrelation for EURIBOR β1
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Figure 50. Partial autocorrelation function for EURIBOR.
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Figure 51. Autocorrelation function for EURIBOR.
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Appendix B. Forecasting results
Table XLII Forecasting results for NIBOR
Mean Std.dev MAE RMSE
Tailored model
1 Week -0.46837 0.074989 0.143988 1.603378
1 Month -0.39918 0.073676 0.088888 0.986538
2 Month -0.35777 0.072777 0.06607 0.689955
3 Month -0.32208 0.072184 0.072775 0.748038
6 Month -0.25977 0.071458 0.077461 0.807563
Random Walk
1 Week -0.306 - 0.041266 0.20466
1 Month -0.255 - 0.055879 0.61901
2 Month -0.227 - 0.068815 0.766286
3 Month -0.2 - 0.055694 0.611376
6 Month -0.142 - 0.046669 0.503883
Actual data
1 Week 1.199274 0.174646 - -
1 Month 1.218387 0.162012 - -
2 Month 1.2375 0.144592 - -
3 Month 1.274194 0.12954 - -
6 Month 1.285242 0.120753 - -
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Table XLIII Forecasting results for STIBOR
Mean Std.dev MAE RMSE
Tailored model
1 Week -0.1678 0.043736 0.037676 0.40226
1 Month -0.11715 0.044275 0.037652 0.419181
2 Month -0.10152 0.044854 0.054079 0.602195
3 Month -0.08481 0.045307 0.060364 0.672187
6 Month -0.01926 0.046067 0.06378 0.71022
Random Walk
1 Week -0.089 - 0.042677 0.475236
1 Month -0.038 - 0.041508 0.462214
2 Month -0.022 - 0.025444 0.283327
3 Month -0.005 - 0.019444 0.216514
6 Month 0.061 - 0.016645 0.183557
Actual data
1 Week -0.13168 0.014043 - -
1 Month -0.07951 0.022615 - -
2 Month -0.04744 0.015645 - -
3 Month -0.02444 0.012907 - -
6 Month 0.044516 0.010224 - -
Table XLIV Forecasting results for EURIBOR
Mean Std.dev MAE RMSE
Tailored model
1 Week -0.1678 0.043736 0.037676 0.40226
1 Month -0.11715 0.044275 0.037652 0.419181
2 Month -0.10152 0.044854 0.054079 0.602195
3 Month -0.08481 0.045307 0.060364 0.672187
6 Month -0.01926 0.046067 0.06378 0.71022
Random Walk
1 Week -0.089 - 0.042677 0.475236
1 Month -0.038 - 0.041508 0.462214
2 Month -0.022 - 0.025444 0.283327
3 Month -0.005 - 0.019444 0.216514
6 Month 0.061 - 0.016645 0.183557
Actual data
1 Week -0.13168 0.014043 - -
1 Month -0.07951 0.022615 - -
2 Month -0.04744 0.015645 - -
3 Month -0.02444 0.012907 - -
6 Month 0.044516 0.010224 - -
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Appendix F. Unobserved effects model
Table XLV Dickey-Fuller test statistics
Table XLVI NIBOR domestic premium
Bank lags test statistics p-value
SHB 2 -2.417 0.0084
DNM 2 -2.831 0.0026
SEB 2 -2.822 0.0027
SWD 2 -2.740 0.0034
DDB 2 -2.912 0.0021
Table XLVII Credit default swap spreads
Bank lags test statistics p-value
SHB 3 -2.289 0.0117
DNM 2 -3.668 0.0002
SEB 3 -3.488 0.0003
SWD 2 -5.042 0.0000
DDB 8 -3.874 0.0001
Table XLVIII Hausman test statistics
Table XLIX NIBOR domestic premium
Bank test statistics p-value
Model 1 13.75 0.0002
Model 2 11.23 0.5097
Model 3 6.91 0.9600
Table L Credit default swap spreads
Bank test statistics p-value
Model 4 2.58 0.9996
Model 5 29.45 0.0431
Table LI Wald test for structural break
Bank test statistics p-value Estimated break date
SHB 142.34 0.0000 2014w11
DNM 120.03 0.0000 2014w12
SEB 137.48 0.0000 2014w11
SWD 138.27 0.0000 2014w12
DDB 127.70 0.0000 2014w12
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Figure 52. NIBOR domestic premium and CDS spreads across banks
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Appendix G. Hidden markov model
Appendix A. Derivation of the hidden markov model
Appendix A.1. Foundation of the hidden markov model
For analysing the time varying high frequency data, we can evaluate a sequence of observed
data as the result of an underlying Hidden Markov process. hidden markov models (hereby HMM)
are often referred to as probabilistic functions of Markov chains, and the earliest work on theory of
probabilistic functions of Markov chains originates from work published by Leonard E. Baum and
his colleagues at the Institute for Defense Analyses(1966; 1967; 1970; 1972). A Markov chain has
the following property:
Definition: Let X = X1, X2, ... be a random process in discrete state space R. It is called a
Markov chain if the conditional probabilities between the outcomes at different times satisfy the
Markov property for every sequence x1, x2, .., xt+1 ∈ R:
P (Xt+1 = xt+1|Xt = xt, Xt−1 = xt−1, ..., X1 = x1) = P (Xt+1 = xt+1|Xt = xt),
and the probability of what we observe is only conditional on the previous observation. The theory
underlying HMMs has been known for decades, however, due to it only being published in math-
ematical journals, its availability and application was for a long time somewhat unknown to other
disciplines. With an increasing amount of tutorials on implementation and theory throughout the
1980s popularity began to rise, especially within the field of speech recognizing. The application
in this paper is programmed in MATLAB R© and based on theory from the article published by
Lawrence R. Rabiner (1989)
To get a firm grip of the HMM, we will first introduce its elements, their properties and rela-
tionship. Thereafter we will look at the implementation issues which arise. The HMM contains
five different elements, which span the basis of the model:
1. N, the number of states in the model. These states follow a Markov process and are by
definition hidden, we do hence not know which state the observation has been extracted
from. Denote the states by S = S1, S2, ..., SN , and the state at time t as qt.
2. M, the number of distinct observation symbols per state. We denote the individual symbols
as V = v1, v2, ..., vk.
3. The state transition probability distribution A = aij , where aij is the probability to transition
from state Si at time t, to state Sj at time t+1:
aij = P [qt+1] = Sj |qt = Si], 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N
4. The observation symbol probability distribution in state j, B = {bj(k)}, where bj(k) is the
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probability of observing vk at time t given state Sj :
bj(k) = P [vk at t|qt = Sj ], 1 ≤ j ≤ N, 1 ≤ k ≤M
5. The initial state distribution pi = {pii} where pii is the probability of starting in state Si:
pii = P [q1 = Si], 1 ≤ i ≤ N
To apply a HMM, we must specify N, M, the number of observation, a discrete distribution
for the observations, and the probability matrices A, B and pi. We will similarly to the article by
Rabiner (1989) use the following notation for the HMM:
λ = (A,B, pi),
where λ is a collective notation for the chosen A, B and pi.
Appendix A.2. Implementation of the hidden markov model
Given the preceding framework, three problems must be addressed in order to efficiently imple-
ment the model:
1. Given the observation sequence O = O1O2 · · ·OT , and a model λ = (A,B, pi), how do we in
an efficient manner compute P (O|λ) - the probability of the observation sequence, given our
model?
2. Given the observation sequence O = O1O2 · · · OT , and a model λ = (A,B, pi), how do we
choose a corresponding state sequence Q = q1q2 · · · qT which best explains the observations?
3. How do we adjust the model parameters of λ = (A,B, pi) in order to maximize P (O|λ).
1. The intuitive approach to calculating P (O|λ) would be to enumerate through every possible
state sequence of length ”T”. Still assuming the underlying process being a Markov chain, the
probability of observing any given sequence O is:
P (O|Q,λ) =
T∏
t=1
P (Ot|qt, λ) = bq1(O1) · bq2(O2) · · · bqT (OT )
The probability of a state sequence Q can be written as:
P (Q|λ) = piq1aq1q2aq2q3 · · · aqT1qT
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The joint probaility of O and Q occuring at the same time must then be the product of the two
preceding terms:
P (O,Q|λ) = P (O|Q,λ)P (Q,λ)
This entails the probability of the observation sequence given the model to be obtained by summing
over the joint probability over all possible state sequences:
P (O|λ) =
∑
Q
P (O|Q,λ)P (Q,λ) =
∑
q1,q2,···,qT
piq1bq1(O1)aq1q2bq2(O2) · · · aqT−1qT bqt(OT )
Observe from the preceding equation that we would need a total of 2T · NT calculations as
there are N possible states that could be reached at any given time. It is then fairly easy to see
that this would be unfeasible for even quite few time steps with N=6 states. It would for instance
imply 2 · 50 · 650 ≈ 8 · 1040 given T=50 - an unfeasible amount of computations. The solution to the
preceding problem is a forward-backward procedure. The procedure consists of a forward and a back-
ward iteration. Only the forward variable is needed to compute P (O|λ), but we will introduce the
backwards variable in this section, as it will be utilized to solve the second implementation problem.
Define the forward variable αt(i) as the probability of the observation sequence until time t,
and that state Si occurs at time t:
αt(i) = P (O1O2 · · ·Ot, qt = Si|λ)
We might then solve the equation for αt(i) inductively by first initializing:
α1(i) = piibi(O1)
and then by forward induction find αt+1(j) iteratively:
αt+1(j) =
[
N∑
i=1
αt(i)aij
]
bj(Ot+1), 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ N
P (O|λ) must then be determined by alpha at time t=T:
P (O|λ) =
N∑
i=1
αT (i)
Observe now with reference to our discussion regarding the problem of having unfeasible
amounts of calculations. By performing the preceding iteration, we now only have N2T calcu-
lations to perform. This entails that we have reduced the number of calculations from 8 · 1040 to
62 · 50 = 1800 computations for our preceding example.
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Then define the backward variable βt(i) as the probability of the observation sequence from
t+1 to time T, given state Si at time t and λ.
βt(i) = P (Ot+1Ot+2 · · ·OT |qt = Si, λ)
Utilizing the inductive procedure for αt(i) starting at time T and going backwards, we might
find βt(i) by first initializing:
βT (i) = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
And then by backwards induction find βt(i):
βt(i) =
N∑
j=1
aijbj(Ot+1)βt+1(j), t = T − 1, T − 2, · · ·, 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
2. The problem may be solved in several different manners, whereas the most dynamic one would
be to apply a Viterbi algorithm, which takes into account limitations concerning possible states to
transcend to. However, since we might reach any state sj from state si, the problem may be solved
straightforward utilizing the forward and backward variables found during the solution to problem
1. In order to find the the optimal state sequence, lets define a variable as the probability of being
in state Si at time t, given the observation sequence and the model:
γt(i) = P (qt = Si|O, λ)
Now observe that this probability might be written as a function of the forward and backward
variable. The explanation being that αt(i) accounts for the sequence O1O2 · · ·Ot and βt(i) accounts
for the sequence Ot+1Ot+2 · · ·OT - both given that the state at time t is Si:
γt(i) =
αt(i)βt(i)
N∑
i=1
αt(i)βt(i)
=
P (O1O2 · · ·Ot, qt = Si|λ)P (Ot+1Ot+2 · · ·OT |qt = Si, λ)
P (O|λ) = P (qt = Si|O, λ)
The denominator serves as a normalization factor, such that γt(i) is a probability satisfying the
following property:
N∑
i=1
γt(i) = 1
We now know that the matrix γt(i) shows the probability of each state at each given point in time,
and might thereby solve for the individually most likely state qt at any given time t using the
following argument:
qt = argmax1≤i≤N [γt(i)], 1 ≤ t ≤ T
3. As for problem 3, there is no known way to analytically solve for the model that maximizes
the probability of the observation sequence. We are however able to choose λ = (A,B, pi) s.t the
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probability of the observation sequence given our model is locally maximized by using an algorithm
such as the Baum-Welch(1970). Applying the Baum-Welch algorithm is known as training the
model as it iteratively improves the likelihood of P (O|λ) with each iteration.
To put the Baum-Welch algorithm to work, we will start by defining the probability of being
in state Si at time t, and state Sj at time t+1 given the model and the observation sequence:
ξt(i, j) = P (qt = Si, qt+1 = Sj |O, λ) = P (qt = Si, qt+1 = Sj , O|λ)
P (O|λ)
Observe now with similar reasoning as with γt(i) we may write ξt(i, j) as follows while noting
that this variable satisfies the desired probability:
ξt(i, j) =
P (qt = Si, qt+1 = Sj |O, λ)
P (O|λ) =
αt(i)aijbj(Ot+1)βt+1(j)
N∑
i=1
αt(i)βt(i)
It is now fairly easy to see the relation between γt(i) and ξt(i, j):
γt(i) =
N∑
j=1
ξt(i, j)
Observe that if we sum the two preceding variables across time, we by (G1) get the expected
number of transitions from Si and by (G2) the expected number of transitions from Si to Sj :
T−1∑
i=1
γt(i) (G1)
T−1∑
i=1
ξt(i, j) (G2)
We might then utilize these two values to calculate new values of the model parameters λ =
(A,B, pi) by the following set of re-estimation equations:
p¯i = γ1(i) (G3)
a¯ij =
T−1∑
t=1
ξt(i, j)
T−1∑
t=1
γt(i)
(G4)
For the observation symbol probability distribution, we need the numerator to be the expected
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number of times in state Sj observing symbol vk, hence:
b¯j(k) =
∑
s.t.Ot=vk
T−1
t=1
γt(j)
T−1∑
t=1
γt(j)
(G5)
These re-estimation equations originate from the intuition brought to the table by Baum and his
colleagues (1970). Define our new model as λ¯ = (A¯, B¯, p¯i). They then proved that if you maximize
the likelihood function G6, this leads in an increase in the likelihood of the model.
max
λ¯
Q(λ, λ¯) =
∑
Q
P (Q|O, λ)log[P (O,Q|λ)] =⇒ P (O|λ¯) > P (O|λ) (G6)
Utilizing this result, we might hence use λ¯ instead of λ and repeat the re-estimation procedure
to bring forth an estimate that could improve the probability of the observation sequence even
further. Note however that this iterative technique will only converge towards the nearest local
maximum of the likelihood function. Hence, the initial values of our model will have a great impact
on our solution considering that the optimization surface is complex and has multiple maximum.
Rabiner (1989) points to the fact that there are no straightforward answer to selecting initial
state. He further states that for A and pi, experience shows that either random or uniform initial
estimates are adequate. For B on the other hand, good initial estimates are helpful in the discrete
case, and more essential for the continuous case. He further points out that initial estimates can be
obtained in a number of ways, such as manual segmentation of sequences into states with averaging
of observations within state, maximum likelihood segmentation of observations with averaging and
segmental k-means segmentation with clustering.
Appendix A.3. Optimizing the hidden markov model
As we wanted to examine short term patterns of the Indicative Deposit Rates, training the
hidden markov model on the entire sequence of observations would yield no insight with regards
to the question at hand. Hence we would have to modify our training of the model, such that it
maximizes P (O|λ) for each defined interval. Addressing the problem in such a manner, we might
start out by dividing our entire data sample into k sequences of data:
O = [O(1), O(2), O(3), ....., O(k)] (G7)
and each observation sequence has the same length
O(k) = O1, O2, O3, ......, OT (G8)
Assuming that the observation sequences are independent of each other, we would now seek to
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maximize
P (O|λ) =
K∏
k=1
P (O(k)|λ) (G9)
and thereby maximize the probability of observing each individual observation sequence given our
model.
Having done this, we are then able to utilize the individual model for each observation sequence
to create the model that is on average the most likely for a given day across the entire set of
observations. We might then write a¯ij , b¯j(l) and p¯ii as:
a¯ij =
1
K
K∑
k=1
a¯kij (G10)
b¯i(l) =
1
K
K∑
k=1
b¯kj (l) (G11)
p¯ii =
1
K
K∑
k=1
p¯iki (G12)
Note that the maximisation criteria entails that we can compare the models using a natural
logarithm transformation. This will help us surpass the problem with having probabilities converg-
ing to zero as the number of sequences increases. Comparing different initial estimates might then
be done by evaluating the following for the trained models λ1 and λ2:
λ∗(A,B, pi) = argmax(
K∑
k=1
(lnP (O(k)|λ1),
K∑
k=1
(lnP (O(k)|λ2)) (G13)
This concludes our derivation of the hidden markov model.
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Appendix B. HMM Model 1: last 10 quotes preceding the fixing
Table LII Log likelihoods 10 last
Maturity / Approach A,pi ,B emp A,pi uni, B emp. A,pi emp, B uni.
1 week -6314.64 -10862.76 -6309.28
3 month -6273.48 -10251.71 -6266.60
6 month -6891.66 -10097.37 -6871.63
Table LIII 1 Week NIBOR
Table LIV State transition matrix A
Bank SEB DDB NDA SWD DNM SHB
SEB 0.3015 0.0927 0.1559 0.2145 0.1368 0.0986
DDB 0.1101 0.3255 0.2725 0.0658 0.0721 0.1541
NDA 0.0895 0.1085 0.3137 0.2995 0.1135 0.0754
SWD 0.1362 0.1038 0.3002 0.1182 0.0782 0.2635
DNM 0.1480 0.0783 0.2394 0.1145 0.2636 0.1562
SHB 0.1028 0.1057 0.0950 0.2387 0.1086 0.3492
Table LV symbol prob. distr. matrix B
Bank Rate down Rate up
SEB 0.5226 0.4774
DDB 0.4977 0.5023
NDA 0.5135 0.4865
SWD 0.4987 0.5013
DNM 0.5066 0.4934
SHB 0.5211 0.4789
Table LVI Initial state distribution matrix pi
Bank SEB DDB NDA SWD DNM SHB
Probability 0.0789 0.0239 0.6192 0.0318 0.0520 0.1941
Table LVII 3 Month NIBOR
Table LVIII State transition matrix A
Bank SEB DDB NDA SWD DNM SHB
SEB 0.3629 0.1023 0.1528 0.1689 0.1013 0.1119
DDB 0.1153 0.2740 0.2631 0.0638 0.1173 0.1665
NDA 0.0970 0.1307 0.3583 0.1902 0.1272 0.0966
SWD 0.1787 0.1018 0.2617 0.1234 0.1363 0.1981
DNM 0.1364 0.1124 0.2392 0.0950 0.1941 0.2230
SHB 0.1044 0.1130 0.1138 0.1749 0.1200 0.3739
Table LIX symbol prob. distr. matrix B
Bank Rate down Rate up
SEB 0.4902 0.5098
DDB 0.4988 0.5012
NDA 0.4801 0.5199
SWD 0.5016 0.4984
DNM 0.4971 0.5029
SHB 0.4774 0.5226
Table LX Initial state distribution matrix pi
Bank SEB DDB NDA SWD DNM SHB
Probability 0.0853 0.0360 0.5438 0.0203 0.0947 0.2199
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Table LXI 6 Month NIBOR
Table LXII State transition matrix A
Bank SEB DDB NDA SWD DNM SHB
SEB 0.3669 0.1810 0.1263 0.0927 0.1153 0.1178
DDB 0.0497 0.2571 0.3245 0.0354 0.2498 0.0835
NDA 0.0846 0.2897 0.2893 0.0873 0.1645 0.0846
SWD 0.1271 0.1456 0.1804 0.1330 0.3016 0.1123
DNM 0.0844 0.3710 0.1477 0.1510 0.1267 0.1192
SHB 0.0731 0.1416 0.1044 0.1154 0.0919 0.4737
Table LXIII symbol prob. distr. matrix B
Bank Rate down Rate up
SEB 0.4796 0.5204
DDB 0.5104 0.4896
NDA 0.4929 0.5071
SWD 0.5056 0.4944
DNM 0.4880 0.5120
SHB 0.4827 0.5173
Table LXIV Initial state distribution matrix pi
Bank SEB DDB NDA SWD DNM SHB
Probability 0.0439 0.0253 0.4708 0.0098 0.3971 0.0531
Appendix C. HMM Model 2: the first 10 quotes of the day
Table LXV Log likelihoods 10 last
Maturity / Approach A,pi ,B emp A,pi uni, B emp. A,pi emp, B uni.
1 week -10994.62 -7745.51 -11173.64
3 month -10742.59 -7842.42 -10508.60
6 month -9937.13 -9074.48 -9152.55
Table LXVI 1 Week NIBOR
Table LXVII State transition matrix A
Bank SEB DDB NDA SWD DNM SHB
SEB 0.1414 0.1360 0.1321 0.2845 0.1558 0.1503
DDB 0.1369 0.1346 0.1370 0.2741 0.1607 0.1568
NDA 0.1390 0.1377 0.1391 0.2716 0.1575 0.1550
SWD 0.2171 0.1813 0.1708 0.1858 0.1208 0.1242
DNM 0.1936 0.1751 0.1662 0.1897 0.1366 0.1388
SHB 0.1866 0.1707 0.1623 0.2038 0.1366 0.1399
Table LXVIII symbol prob. distr. matrix B
Bank Rate down Rate up
SEB 0.8199 0.1801
DDB 0.7469 0.2531
NDA 0.6904 0.3096
SWD 0.0788 0.9212
DNM 0.4425 0.5575
SHB 0.4761 0.5239
Table LXIX Initial state distribution matrix pi
Bank SEB DDB NDA SWD DNM SHB
Probability 0.3331 0.0834 0.0561 0.4694 0.0285 0.0294
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Table LXX 3 Month NIBOR
Table LXXI State transition matrix A
Bank SEB DDB NDA SWD DNM SHB
SEB 0.1598 0.1587 0.2127 0.1424 0.1598 0.1667
DDB 0.1641 0.1612 0.2092 0.1418 0.1587 0.1650
NDA 0.2014 0.1992 0.1728 0.1508 0.1364 0.1393
SWD 0.1638 0.1661 0.2157 0.1439 0.1529 0.1576
DNM 0.2022 0.2012 0.1618 0.1577 0.1382 0.1390
SHB 0.2055 0.2041 0.1568 0.1597 0.1372 0.1367
Table LXXII symbol prob. distr. matrix B
Bank Rate down Rate up
SEB 0.8911 0.1089
DDB 0.9056 0.0944
NDA 0.1272 0.8728
SWD 0.5771 0.4229
DNM 0.3476 0.6524
SHB 0.3065 0.6935
Table LXXIII Initial state distribution matrix
pi
Bank SEB DDB NDA SWD DNM SHB
Probability 0.2312 0.2963 0.3914 0.0157 0.0298 0.0357
Table LXXIV 6 Month NIBOR
Table LXXV State transition matrix A
Bank SEB DDB NDA SWD DNM SHB
SEB 0.1322 0.1319 0.1722 0.2572 0.1473 0.1592
DDB 0.1318 0.1318 0.1723 0.2571 0.1480 0.1590
NDA 0.1751 0.1767 0.1297 0.1583 0.2248 0.1353
SWD 0.1651 0.1676 0.1254 0.1949 0.2279 0.1190
DNM 0.1323 0.1329 0.1615 0.2563 0.1741 0.1429
SHB 0.1655 0.1677 0.1363 0.1761 0.2185 0.1360
Table LXXVI symbol prob. distr. matrix B
Bank Rate down Rate up
SEB 0.7185 0.2815
DDB 0.7263 0.2737
NDA 0.3339 0.6661
SWD 0.0918 0.9082
DNM 0.9014 0.0986
SHB 0.4312 0.5688
Table LXXVII Initial state distribution matrix
pi
Bank SEB DDB NDA SWD DNM SHB
Probability 0.0268 0.0273 0.0155 0.4345 0.4825 0.0135
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